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TOWARD A SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
FOR SMALL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Thomas Cmar*

INTRODUCTION
Money is the lifeblood of electoral politics. A political campaign is
almost never successful unless its resources are comparable to those of its
opponentsand the most important of these resources is money. As
Alexander Heard described it, political money “is a universal, transferable
unit infinitely more flexible in its uses than the time, or ideas, or talent, or
influence, or controlled votes that also constitute contributions to politics.”1
Money has always been crucial to political success, but for modern
campaigns it has taken on a singular, overriding importance. In the 2002
congressional elections, 94% of the candidates who raised the most money
won their races. 2 Winners out-raised losers approximately four to one. 3
The overwhelming correlation between fundraising success and electoral
victory exists even in primary elections, where the partisan makeup of the
district does not give any candidate an inherent advantage. The biggest

* Legal Analyst, United States Public Interest Research Group Democracy Program (“U.S.
PIRG”); J.D., Harvard Law School, 2004. (YEARS??) First and foremost, the author
thanks U.S. PIRG Senior Democracy Advocate Adam Lioz for his extensive and invaluable
editorial assistance on this Article, which began as a project for a summer internship but
rapidly evolved into something much larger. The author also thanks Derek Cressman,
Alison Cassady, Dana Mason, and everyone else at U.S. PIRG who offered editorial
suggestions and research support; Lydia Gilbert, who provided valuable early research
assistance; and Guy Smith, who sent the author his unpublished research. Finally, the
author thanks Rob Boatright, Steve Weissman, Spencer Overton, Andrew Goldsmith, Judith
Miller, and John Bonifaz for their generosity in commenting on drafts of the Article and/or
talking through some of the issues contained herein.
1. ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 90 (1960). Alexander Heard
authored this work shortly before his tenure as chairman of President Kennedy’s
Commission on Campaign Costs. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
2. ADAM LIOZ, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 14 (2003) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF MONEY], available at
http://www.uspirg.org/reports/roleofmoney2003.pdf.
3. Id.
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fundraisers won primary elections in 2002 more than 90% of the time.4
Incumbency plays an important role in these statistics: 92.7% of House
incumbents and 85.7% of Senate incumbents who ran in 2002 won reelection. 5 The high re-election rate of incumbents, however, is due in no
small part to their ability to raise large sums of money; in 2002, the average
incumbent out-raised his or her opponent by a ratio of 4.5-to-1. 6
The primacy of television advertising as a modern campaign tactic has
increased the importance of money. Federal candidates, parties, and
pPolitical aAction cCommittees (“PACs”) spent more than $1 billion on
television advertising in 2002. 7 More than any other factor, television
spending has contributed to an “arms race” mentality within political
campaigns, steadily escalating from election cycle to election cycle without
regard to the ads’ consequences for democracy. 8 Rather than being a
testament to the value of free speech, the modern campaign practice of
raising millions of dollars in contributions from the privately wealthy and
spending most of them on a large number of short, repetitive television
advertisements undermines the societal interest in open and informed
debate that is protected by the First Amendment. 9
Voters collectively decide who represents them in elected office. The
nature of the voters’ decision, however, is determined by innumerable
smaller decisions that precede it. These decisionssuch as which
candidates decide to run in the first place, and which candidates receive the
4. U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE WEALTH PRIMARY: THE ROLE OF BIG MONEY IN THE
2002
CONGRESSIONAL
PRIMARIES
6
(2002),
available
at
http://www.uspirg.org/reports/WealthPrimary10_02.pdf.
5. THE ROLE OF MONEY, supra note 2, at 31. The percentage of victorious House
incumbents includes those incumbents whose districts were eliminated through redistricting, but who successfully sought re-election in another district. Id. at 31-32.
6. See id. at 32 (“The average incumbent participating in the 2002 general election
raised $1,230,151, compared with $270,491 for the average challenger.”).
7. Press Release, Alliance for Better Campaigns, Record Political Ad Spending on
Television Topped $1 Billion in 2002 (Nov. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/pressrelease.php?ReleaseID=40.
8. See, e.g., JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: DEMOCRACY, THE
INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING 39 (2004) (“Each year, TV advertising
becomes more dominant, more ubiquitous, and more expensive, at the same time it becomes
less effective. That’s why in politics we’ve become caught in a self-defeating cycle.”).
9. Cf. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S.
604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(“It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and
expenditureswhich tend to protect equal access to the political arena, to free
candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fund-raising, and to
diminish the importance of repetitive 30-second commercialswill be adverse to
the interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment.
Id.”).
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opportunity to communicate their messages effectively to the
electorateare heavily influenced by the flow of political money. 10 By
essentially determining which candidates are able to make it onto a given
primary or general election ballot, donors help to define the field of
possibility in American politics.
Despite the importance of monetary participation to the viability of
political campaigns, the current federal system of campaign finance
regulation creates huge obstacles to the equal participation of grassroots
candidates of all parties and ideologies and the small donors who might
otherwise support them. The 2004 presidential campaign has shown that,
in an election perceived to be of great historical significance, campaigns’
growing use of the Internet to reach out to small donors can result in large
numbers of small contributions to political campaigns. 11 In most successful
political campaigns for federal office, however, small donors play only a
marginal role. 12 Although congressional election campaigns reported more
than $1 billion in total receipts for the 2002 election cycle, 13 only 24% of
the money raised from individuals came in contributions under $200,
accounting for less than 14% of candidates’ total receipts.14 By contrast,
55.5% of the money raised from individuals came in contributions of
$1000 or more. 15 These large contributions came from only approximately
202,245 donorsless than 0.09% of the U.S. population. 16
In these races, it is the wealthy who are making the crucial early-stage
choices of which candidates will receive the resources they need to run
viable campaigns. Wealthy donors have political preferences and concerns
that are distinct from those of other Americans, 17 yet generally only those
10. See generally U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON:
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES SHUT OUT BY BIG MONEY 6 (2003) (profiling forty-nine
unsuccessful congressional candidates whose campaigns were severely handicapped by their
failure to match their opponents’ fundraising) [hereinafter LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING TO
WASHINGTON], available at http://www.uspirg.org/reports/lookwhosnot1_03.pdf.
11. See Linda Feldmann, In politics, the rise of small donors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 28, 2004 (quoting Virginia Professor Larry Sabato as stating that there are “always . . .
increases in small gifts when people feel very strongly in an election”), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0628/p01s01-uspo.html.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 13-16.
13. THE ROLE OF MONEY, supra note 2, at 10 n.e. Total receipts include contributions
from individuals, parties, and PACs, as well as personal money and interest earned on
campaign accounts. Id.
14. Id. at 16, 18.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 15.
17. See JOHN GREEN ET AL., INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS:
WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM-MINDED (1998) (finding that large-dollar
contributors as a group tend to be significantly more conservative than the general public),
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candidates who appeal to wealthy donors’ concerns are able to amass
sufficient resources to compete effectively. Because current federal
campaign finance laws allow individual contributions to candidates of up to
$2100 per election, 18 candidates who could potentially have broad popular
appeal but are unable to attract the support of wealthy donors find it very
difficult to compete. 19 Meanwhile, those Americans who cannot afford to
participate are marginalized in this “wealth primary,” robbing them of the
opportunity to have the same voice as wealthy donors in choosing which
candidates are able to build a successful campaign and ultimately to win
their elections.20
The wealth primary takes place in the early stages of the American
political process, where political agendas are set and candidates first decide
to run for office. The disproportionate level of influence and access that
large-dollar contributors acquire through the wealth primary is partly
responsible for wealthy Americans being more likely to make their voices
heard in government and to have their interests represented there.21
Meanwhile, over the last forty years, voter turnout in federal elections has
significantly decreased. 22 Because the wealth primary prevents average

available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.asp.
18. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81,
102-03 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a). The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 raised
individual contribution limits to candidates to $2000 for the 2004 election cycle. Id. The
Act also indexed contribution limits to inflation so that, for the current cycle, individuals
may contribute up to $2100 to a candidate. Id.
19. See generally LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON, supra note 10.
20. See generally Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
Primary, 11 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 273, 273-332 (1993) (arguing that the decisive role of
private wealth in federal elections rises to the level of a de facto primary that deprives
excluded candidates and citizens of their constitutional right to equal protection of law).
21. See AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 5 (2004) (“Those who enjoy
higher incomes, more occupational success, and the highest levels of formal education, are
the ones most likely to participate in politics and make their needs and values known to
government officials.”), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf.
22. See id. at 6-7 (arguing that “a number of ongoing trends discourage voting and
reinforce inequalities in voter turnout,” including rising economic inequality, felon
disenfranchisement laws, and the tendency of major political parties to focus their
mobilization efforts on those who are already politicaly active and able to make political
contributions). The most recent peak in voter turnout in a presidential election was in 1960,
when 62.8% of voting-aged Americans participated in the race between John F. Kennedy
and Richard Nixon. Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, Presidential Election Voter Turnout:
1924-2000, at http://www.fairvote.org/turnout/preturn.htm (last visited May 17, 2005).
Official turnout for the 2000 presidential election was 51.8% of the voting-aged population.
Id. Perhaps even more tellingly, more people watched the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960
than the Bush-Gore debates in 2000, even though America had 100 million fewer people
then. THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF
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Americans from having an equal say in who represents them in
government, Americans feel less and less invested in the democratic
process. 23
When federal campaign contribution limits allow the wealthiest
Americans to give far more money than most potential donors can afford,
many candidates, parties, and PACs lack compelling reasons to pursue
small-dollar contributionsand in the absence of a contest that is
perceived to be of such singular importance as the 2004 presidential race,
most Americans lack sufficient incentive to give them. 24 In the absence of
such a particularly important and/or closely-fought election, it is only
rational for the average American to perceive that his or her small
contribution does not count for much against the contributions of wealthy
donors who can afford to give thousands of dollars. 25
Two measures of campaign finance reform prominently advocated in
recent years address the problem of political inequality in privately
financed elections: low contribution limits and public financing. Lowering
campaign contribution limits makes sense as a matter of basic fairness:
contribution limits should be set at a level that average Americans can
afford so that wealthy donors are not allowed to systematically outspend
average Americans and buy for themselves a greater say in which
candidates are able to run successful campaigns. Public financing
addresses a related concern, giving qualified candidates a source of funding

UNCERTAINTY 15, 122 (2002).
23. See Jamin B. Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Wealth Primary: Campaign Fundraising
and
the
Constitution,
available
at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/law_wp/wealth09.htm#Heading12 (last visited Apr.il 20,
2005) (noting that the wealth primary excludes voters and “leaves poorer citizens without a
natural rallying point in the electoral process”).
24. Cf., Press Release, Campaign Finance Institute, CFI Analysis of the Presidential
Candidates’ Financial Reports Filed June 20 (June 20, 2004) (finding that small
contributions to the 2004 presidential candidates were triple and large contributions were
double the amounts contributed in 2000), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/063004.html.
25. See, e.g., LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON, supra note 10, at 37-38. One
powerful example of this phenomenon is an anecdote told by Victor Morales, a public
school government teacher and city councilman for twenty-two years who was the 1996
Democratic nominee for Senator in Texas:
[Morales] secured 44% of the vote against [incumbent Republican Senator] Phil
Gramm despite being vastly outspent. Morales raised approximately $900,000 in
the last four months of this campaign, 87% of which he estimates came from
contributions less than $100. . . . “During my 1996 campaign,” he [says], “I ran
into two of my former students walking out of the post office. They said[,] ‘Mr.
Morales, we’re so proud of you. When we see you on TV, we saythat’s our
government teacher. We were going to send you $25 each, but we didn’t because
we thought ‘what’s $25, he needs millions.’’”
Id.
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that is independent of donations made from the private wealth of
individuals. Ideally, these two reforms would be established alongside one
another, reducing the influence of wealthy donors while ensuring that
candidates are able to run their campaigns on a level playing field.
A third campaign finance reform approach that addresses the problem of
political inequality in privately financed elections is the creation of
government-sponsored incentive programs to promote small political
contributions. Proposals for such programs typically call for the creation of
a tax credit for political contributions, but they could also involve means
outside of the tax code such as a contribution refund or campaign finance
voucher program. Although the concept of political contribution incentives
has been around for decades, the programs have been subject to
surprisingly little scholarly study.
Proponents of political contribution incentives argue that they will bring
into the political process new, small-dollar contributors who would
otherwise not be able to afford to contribute. Political contribution
incentives would also would open up the “wealth primary” by giving small
donors a stronger voice in the American political process and rewarding
candidates who conduct grassroots, issue-driven campaigns. Moreover,
political campaigns’ growing use of the Internet as a cost-effective means
to reach out to small donors makes political contribution incentives more
viable today than ever before.
Opponents of political contribution incentives object chiefly on the
grounds that experience with the programs shows that they do not live up to
their promise. 26 The federal government offered a tax credit (and, briefly, a
tax deduction) for small political contributions from 1972 to 1986. 27 This
tax credit program enjoyed modest success but did not bring about large
increases in small-dollar contributions. 28 Several states currently maintain
political contribution incentive programs, allowing for the study of how
different credit programs operate in different legal contexts.29 Some of the
state tax credit programs that have operated in tandem with different

26. See, e.g., Guy Lincoln Smith, A Third Way in Campaign Finance Reform: Political
Contribution Credits and Their Role in Increasing Political Equality 24-25 (2001)
(unpublished Harvard University senior thesis, Harvard University, used with permission)
(on file with author) (stating that opponents to tax incentives refer to them as “irrelevant”).
27. DAVID ROSENBERG, BROADENING THE BASE: THE CASE FOR A NEW FEDERAL TAX
CREDIT FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 7 (2002) (analyzing the effectiveness of tax credits
for
political
contributions
in
different
states),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/doclib/20030425_rosenberg.pdf.
28. See id. at 7-8 (noting that by the 1980s about 4-6% of taxpayers were filing for the
federal tax credit).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 109-181.
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campaign finance laws than the federal program have enjoyed greater
success.
A careful study of experiences at both the state and federal levels reveals
that the structure of a contribution incentive program plays a significant
role in determining its success.30 State programs structured similarly to the
federal tax credit program have largely replicated the federal experience.31
Meanwhile, more successful state programs have made it easier for people
to claim the incentives and made them available for contributions to a
wider variety of political actors, including candidates, parties, and PACs.32
Moreover, the structure of other laws that regulate campaign fundraising
has important effects on the success of an incentive program. 33 A political
contribution incentive program will be successful at bringing in new small
donors only if potential recipients of contributions actively solicit those
donors and encourage them to participate in the incentive program.
A campaign finance voucher program is the most potent, and thus the
most promising, form of political contribution incentive program. Tax
credits or refund programs require individuals in effect to float an interestfree loan to a candidate, party, or PAC while they wait for their
contribution to be reimbursed. A voucher program would provide
individuals with an equal amount of money, up front, for them to make
small contributions to the candidate or political group of their choice. An
individual’s ability to give would not be contingent on whether or not he or
she owed taxes or had sufficient disposable income. In the process,
individuals participating in a voucher program would do so as members of
a democracy with an equal status not based on private wealth. A voucher
program would force political fundraisers to compete for its funds through
effective communication of political ideas, rather than through coddling
individual wealthy donors.
This Article will review the history of political contribution incentive
programs in the United States and conclude that the programs can play an
important role in a pragmatic reform strategy to give small donors a central
role in the financing of political campaigns. Campaign finance voucher
systems and other ways to administer political contribution incentives
outside the tax code should be explored as part of a long-term strategy of
creating a “small donor democracy.” Additional reforms, such as low
contribution limits and public financing, will also be necessary to any
comprehensive solution to the problem of political inequality in campaign
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra text accompanying notes 225-232.
See infra text accompanying notes 145-148.
See infra text accompanying notes 149-181.
See infra text accompanying notes 225-232.

CMARCHRISTENSEN

108

2/3/2011 10:02 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXII

finance. A reform strategy centered on political contribution incentives
places the power to choose which candidates receive public funding in the
hands of individual small donors. These donors can only participate on
truly equal terms with one another, however, if wealthy donors are
prevented from turning private wealth into disproportionate political
influence.
Even the most optimistic campaign finance reform advocate would
likely agree that a lasting solution to campaign finance inequality will only
be achieved after years of a political skirmishing between proponents and
opponents of reform. One step that Congress could take right away that
could potentially garner immediate bipartisan and cross-ideological support
would be to establish a new federal tax credit for political contributions.
The tax credit should be for a significant amount, to provide a strong
incentive for small donors to contribute, but it should also be set at a low
enough level that giving the maximum amount will not be out of reach for
most Americans. 34 To encourage maximum participation, the tax credit
should be available for contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs.35
Although many campaign finance reform advocates vilify PACs (and the
technique of “bundling” individual contributions) as a principal evil of
campaign finance, 36 the real problem is not the PACs themselves, but the
political inequality that results when high contribution limits allow PACs to
leverage private wealth into disproportionate influence over the political
process. 37 Another way to encourage participation is through public
education efforts that encourage small donors to take advantage of the
credit. 38 Finally, the tax credit should be targeted directly at small donors
by making it claimable only for small contributions when the donor’s total
contributions to that candidate, party, or PAC do not exceed the maximum
amount of the credit during that election cycle. 39 The tax credit could also
provide an immediate stimulus to the growth of small donor democracy
through Internet-based grassroots campaigns. If a new federal tax credit for
political contributions designed in this way were proven effective in
increasing small donor participation, such success could provide
momentum for achieving additional reforms.
I.

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVE

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra text accompanying notes 236-240.
See infra text accompanying notes 243-244.
See infra text accompanying notes 213-217.
See infra text accompanying notes 218-224.
See infra text accompanying notes 245-252.
See infra text accompanying note 242.
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PROGRAMS
A.

Legislative Hhistory of the Ffederal Ttax Ccredit for Ppolitical
Ccontributions

The federal government offered targeted tax incentives for political
contributions between 1972 and 1986. 40 From 1972 to 1974, taxpayers
could choose to claim a 50% tax credit for donations to federal, state, and
local candidates and party organizations up to a limit of $12.50 (or $25 for
a married couple filing jointly), or they could choose to take a 100%
deduction off their adjusted gross income for their first $50 of federal,
state, or local contributions (or $100 for married couples filing jointly).41
For the tax year 1975, both of these tax incentives were doubled, creating a
50% tax credit of up to $25 for individuals and $50 for joint returns, and a
100% tax deduction of up to $100 for individuals and up to $200 for joint
returns. 42 A few years later, Congress doubled the tax credit again while
repealing the tax deduction.43
In 1986, Congress reversed course and repealed the political contribution
tax credit as part of a sweeping simplification of the tax code that
eliminated a large number of tax credits and deductions. 44 Targeted tax
incentives still survive as a means for the government to promote what it
considers socially beneficial activities, however, and since 1986 Congress
has added many new tax incentives to the code. 45
1.

Debate and passage of a federal tax credit for political contributions

A federal tax credit for political contributions was first proposed in
Congress in the 1950s. 46 In 1957, the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration reported favorably a bill that would have created a 50% tax
credit for the first $20 of political contributions to federal candidates, or an
alternative 100% tax deduction for up to $100. 47 In October 1961,

40. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 7.
41. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§Sec. 701-02, §§ 41, 218, 85 Stat. 497,
560-62 (1971).
42. Tariff Schedules Amendments, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, §Sec. 12, §§ 41(B)(1),
218(B)(1), 88 Stat. 2108, 2120 (1975).
43. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 13, §§ 41(B), 218, 92 Stat. 2763, 2778
(1978).
44. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §Sec. 112, § 24, 100 Stat. 2085, 210809 (1986).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 102-107.
46. HEARD, supra note 1, at 394.
47. Id. at 448.
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President Kennedy appointed a bipartisan Commission on Campaign Costs
to study ways to increase public participation in the financing of
campaigns. 48 The Commission recommended tax incentives as a central
aspect of its report, calling for the creation of a system where taxpayers
could choose either a 50% tax credit for their first $10 in contributions or a
tax deduction for up to $1000 in contributions.49 According to President
Kennedy, “it is essential to broaden the base of financial support for
candidates and parties. To accomplish this, improvement of public
understanding of campaign finance, coupled with a system of incentives for
solicitation and giving, is necessary.” 50 President Kennedy and former
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, as well as the major party candidates
who stood for election against them, all endorsed the Commission’s
report. 51 White House advocacy for these and similar reforms continued
during the Johnson administration, 52 but attempts to create a political
contribution incentive as part of a broader package of electoral reforms was
never passed by both houses of Congress. Nevertheless, both Republicans
and Democrats supported tax incentives as a means of broadening the base
of contributors to campaigns. 53
Championed by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), tax credits for
political contributions were once again a topic of debate during the Nixon

48. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House Transmitting Bills tTo Carry out Recommendations of the
Commission on Campaign Costs (May 29, 1962) [hereinafter Kennedy Letter], available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8687&st=&st1=. For more information
on the President’s Commission on Campaign Costs, see generally HERBERT E. ALEXANDER,
MONEY IN POLITICS (1972) (describing the work of the Commission). Herbert Alexander,
who went on to write numerous works on campaign finance, was Executive Director of the
Commission. See id. at iii.
49. Kennedy Letter, supra note 48. In recommending the Commission’s proposal to
Congress, President Kennedy reduced the amount proposed for the tax deduction from
$1000 to $750. Id. Additionally, the proposed tax incentives would only have applied to
contributions to national and state political committees. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Election
Reform: The Political Process in America (May 25, 1967) (calling for Congress to
reconsider the Kennedy Commission’s report, as well as alternative proposals for public
financing
of
campaigns),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28268&st=political+process&st1=Amer
ica.
53. See, e.g., G.O.P. Calls for Tax Incentives to Spur Political Contributions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1967, at 32 (quoting a Republican spokesman arguing in favor of Democratic
proposals for tax incentives for political contributions as opposed to proposals for public
funding of campaigns).
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administration. 54 Senator Kennedy attempted to attach a package of
election reforms that included creation of a tax credit to the Tax Reform
Act of 1969; his amendment was tabled by a 50 to 45 vote. 55 Senator
Kennedy pursued a similar tactic two years later, this time proposing an
amendment to the Revenue Act of 1971 that provided for tax credits
alone. 56 This amendment was never acted upon, however, as Senator John
Pastore (D-R.I.) successfully offered his own campaign finance
amendment, a more comprehensive proposal that added two titles to the
Revenue Act: one title that created both tax credits and deductions, and
another title that created a tax check-off to establish a system of partial
public financing for presidential campaigns through the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund. 57 Debate on the Pastore aAmendment dragged
on for several days, with most of the attention focused on the more
controversial public funding provisions. 58 Meanwhile, the creation of tax
incentives for political contributions enjoyed strong support from both
parties. 59 Ultimately, both titles of the Pastore aAmendment passed the

54. Warren Weaver, Senate Backs Retirement at 60 on Benefits of 66%, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1969, at 1.
55. Id.
56. S. Amdt. 643, 117 CONG. REC. 40,688-89 (1971) (providing for a 50% tax credit of
up to $12.50 for individuals or $25 for joint returns). Senator Kennedy did not include a tax
deduction in his proposal because he wanted to specifically to to target low- and middleincome citizens. See id. at 40, 688 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
57. S. Amdt. 692, 117 CONG. REC. 41,758-61 (1971). The Presidential Election
Campaign Fund was originally established by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966). The following year, however, Congress
passed a law stating that the Fund could not go into effect until further implementing
guidelines were adopted. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (1967).
58. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 41,764 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore) (“I think the
time has come . . . when something has to be done about the idea that a man who runs for
President has to be either personally wealthy or has to become beholden to a lot of people
with vested interests.”); id. at 41,770 (statement of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)) (“This is
not the time for the Congress of the United States to say that the American political system
has become so incestuous that we are going to provide money from the public funds for our
own perpetuation in office.”).
59. See, e.g., id. at 42,381-82 (statement of Sen. Jack Miller (R-Iowa)). According to
Senator Miller, a tax credit for political contributions had a history of support from both
parties:
[T]here has always been strong support on this side of the aisle . . . for a limited
tax deduction or a tax credit on the income tax return for political
contributions . . . . I have done so in order that people in general can join in
financing the campaigns of political candidates and political parties, and let the
chips fall where they may. I see no reason why a tax credit, for example, should
not work with equal favor to the members of both parties.
Id.
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Senate. 60 While the public funding provisions passed by a narrow margin
of 52 to 47, the tax incentive provisions passed by a vote of 82 to 17.61
President Nixon signed the bill into law, but only after convincing the
House-Senate conference committee to delay the effect of the public
funding provisions until after the 1972 election. 62
2.

Effects of federal tax incentives for political contributions from 1972
to 1986

When Congress enacted the tax credit and deduction for political
contributions in 1971, it had little way of knowing how the programs would
affect political campaigning. Apparently, Congress believed that simply
limiting the credit to a small amount of contributions was sufficient to
target its effects toward small donors.63 Hence, the legislation lacked
several design features that would likely have encouraged greater citizen
participation. The tax incentives were not accompanied either by a public
education campaign to encourage their use or any mechanism to guarantee
that the programs were not simply rewarding those who were already
giving anyway. Perhaps most importantly, Congress gave no special
consideration to creating incentives for candidates to solicit creditsubsidized contributions actively rather than to continue pursuing large
contributions from wealthy donors.
Throughout the 1970s, debate over the best policy approach for
addressing citizen participation and political equality concerns in political
campaigns continued. As in the debate over the Revenue Act of 1971, the
two competing policy alternatives before Congress were tax incentives and
public financing. 64 Although Congress ultimately rejected more expensive
proposals for direct public financing and even greater expansions of the tax
credit, Congress twice doubled the amounts of the tax credit “to further
expand individual participation in the electoral process . . . through the
encouragement of political contributions.” 65

60. Id. at 42,632-33.
61. Id.
62. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-02, 85 Stat. 497, 562-74.
63. See S. REP. NO. 95-1263, at 59 (1978) (“[S]ince the credit is small, it probably has
the greatest incentive effect with respect to contributors of moderate amounts.”).
64. See, e.g., Increased Tax Credits for Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. Senate:
Hearings on S.1471 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 29 (1977) (debating proposals that would have provided
either direct public financing for Senate candidates or a 75% tax credit for contributions up
to $100 to a Senate candidate’s campaign) [hereinafter Tax Credits Hearings].
65. S. REP. NO. 95-1263, at 59 (1978). At the same time as Congress doubled the tax
credit for the second time in 1978, it also repealed the tax deduction, stating that it “add[s]
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Participation rates for the federal tax credit for political contributions
between 1972 and 1986 show that the program was a modest success in its
later years. In 1972, 3.5% of those filing tax returns took advantage of
either the tax credit or deduction, costing the federal treasury a total of
$78.8 million.66 After Congress doubled the value of the incentives in
1975, participation that year was only 2.7%, with a total of $99 million in
credits and deductions claimed. 67
For the year 1979, the first year after Congress doubled the amount of
the tax credit again while repealing the tax deduction, it is possible to
calculate participation as a percentage of taxpayers who were eligible to
claim the crediti.e., taxpayers who actually hadowed tax liability prior to
claiming any tax credits.68 In 1979, 5.5% of eligible filers claimed the
credit at a cost of $193.5 million. 69 This number rose to a high of 7.2% of
eligible tax filers claiming $269.8 million during the presidential election
year of 1980, 70 but ultimately dipped back down and settled at a rate of
5.3% of eligible tax filers claiming $241.7 million for the credit’s last year
of existence in 1986. 71
The participation rates of the federal tax credit for political contributions
suggest that the credit had at least a marginally positive effect on the
number of contributors to political campaigns. Nevertheless, because the
complexity to the law without serving any significant purpose,” given that tax credits are a
more direct means of encouraging greater political participation. H. REP. NO. 95-1445, at 5
(1978).
66. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND ITS OPERATION 29 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. This percentage is a more accurate measure of participation rates, because it
does not count those whose lack of tax liability left them with no need for a tax incentive.
Even this percentage is in some senses under-inclusive, however, because it fails to count
those who gave a political contribution that was claimed under the credit but did not file
their own tax returni.e., because they were included in a joint return. This percentage also
does not include those who would have claimed a tax credit for political contributions but
did not need to because their tax liability was exhausted after claiming other tax credits.
69. See 2 Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income Bulletin 44 (Summer 1982)
(reporting that in 1979, 74,243,824 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of
92,694,302 tax filers); CANTOR, supra note 66, at 29 (reporting that 4.4% of total taxpayers
claimed the credit in 1979 at a cost of $193.5 million).
70. See 5 Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income Bulletin 80 (Fall 1985) (reporting
that in 1980, 76,135,819 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of 93,902,469 tax
filers) [hereinafter Statistics of Income Bulletin (Fall 1985)]; CANTOR, supra note 66, at 29
(reporting that 5.8% of total taxpayers claimed the credit in 1980 at a cost of $269.8
million).
71. See 10 Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income Bulletin 104 (Fall 1990)
(reporting that in 1986, 86,975,883 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of
103,299,601 tax filers); CANTOR, supra note 66, at 29 (reporting that 4.5% of total taxpayers
claimed the credit in 1986 at a cost of $241.7 million).
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Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) did not begin documenting
contributions until 1976, and until 1989 only itemized contributions of
more than $500, 72 it is impossible to know the exact effect that the tax
credit for political contributions had on small donor participation and
influence between 1972 and 1986.
3.

Congress repealed the tax credit for political contributions as part of
an effort to simplify the tax code

Congress repealed the tax credit for political contributions as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA”). 73 The TRA was the result of a
bipartisan compromise between the Reagan Administration and Democratic
leaders in Congress. The stated intent behind the Act was to reduce
burdens for the majority of individual taxpayers by simplifying the tax code
to eliminate loopholes through which more sophisticated taxpayers were
avoiding payment of the full percentage rate for their income class. 74 The
TRA’s supporters also argued that targeted tax incentives had caused
serious unintended consequences, distorting free market incentives in ways
that produced economically harmful effects. 75 The theory behind the TRA
was that all taxpayers would benefit from a simpler tax code; in reducing
administrative burdens and opportunities for tax avoidance, the government
could afford to tax at lower rates across all income classes. Many of the
Act’s supporters thus argued that it was designed to favor the interests of

72. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, YOUR GUIDE TO RESEARCHING PUBLIC RECORDS, at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/prguide1.htm (last visited May 7, 2005). In 1989, the FEC
began tracking itemized contributions of $200 or more. Id. Because of this, even today the
number of small donors to campaigns is only an estimate. Exact numbers are only
knowable if the campaign self-reports.
73. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. (1998)).
74. See David E. Rosenbaum, Tax Revision Bill Wins Passage in the House on Shift in
G.O.P. Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1985, at A1.
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426 (1985). The House Ways and Means Committee’s report
argued that
[t]ax incentives, even if individually designed to promote desired objectives,
collectively cause significant economic distortions and increase the burden of the
tax system in other sectors of the economy. Incentives designed to encourage
investment and increase productivity often have unintended results, such as the
substitution of less productive, but tax-favored, assets for more productive
investments. . . . In many cases, such investments are made only because they
produce large deductions and credits that may be used to offset other income, and,
importantly, not because there is a market demand for the services provided by
these investments.
Id.
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average Americans over those of the wealthy and large corporations.76
The tax credit for political contributions was swept up in this larger
movement to simplify the tax code. The tax legislation that emerged from
the House Ways and Means Committee repealed the credit along with a
variety of other tax preferences. 77 The New York Times reported that even
lawmakers who otherwise supported political contribution incentives “were
reluctant to challenge the President and [Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.)] on such a relatively minor topic.”78
While the bill was pending in the House, however, Representatives
Matthew McHugh (D-N.Y.) and Thomas Tauke (R-Iowa) introduced a
proposal that would have replaced the 50% tax credit for contributions to
federal, state, and local candidates with a 100% tax credit that applied only
to contributions to congressional candidates from the candidate’s home
state up to $100 (or $200 for married couples filing jointly).79 Although
the McHugh Amendment was rejected by the Ways and Means Committee,
Democrats in the Rules Committee succeeded in allowing for its
consideration on the floor, and it passed by a vote of 230 to 196.80 The
Senate, however, did not include a similar proposal in its version of the
bill, 81 and the provision did not survive the House-Senate conference.
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reveals that
Congress had three primary motives for repealing the tax credit for political
contributions. 82 First, many congressional supporters of the Act felt it
inappropriate to retain the credit on the one hand while on the other hand
eliminating many credits and incentives for other activities.83 Some
members of Congress even argued that retaining the credit (or expanding it
through the McHugh Amendment) would smack of self-dealing and
corruption. 84 Second, TRA proponents questioned the efficacy of the

76. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 35,836 (1985) (statement of Rep. Pete Stark (D-Cal.)) (“A
vote for the bill is a vote for [the] citizen taxpayer. . . . If you have billions of dollars in a
sector rich in tax shelters, then you are against the bill.”).
77. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426 (1985). Among other changes, the bill repealed the
regular investment tax credit, partially repealed the tax credit for fuels from nonconventional sources, and abolished a variety of “tax shelters” such as the two-earner
deduction for couples and tax exclusions for the first $100 in dividends. Id.
78. David E. Rosenbaum, Panel Votes to End Political Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1985, at D6.
79. 131 CONG. REC. 37,374-75 (1985).
80. Rosenbaum, supra note 74.
81. See S. REP. NO. 99-313 (1986).
82. John Warren Kindt, The New Assault on Freedom of Thought: Section 263A of the
Internal Revenue Code, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 137, 139-46 (1988).
83. See S. REP. NO. 99-313.
84. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 3838 Before the Senate Comm.
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credit as a means of encouraging new, small-dollar contributions given that
IRS data suggested that political contribution incentives were used
disproportionately by wealthy taxpayers. 85 Finally, proponents of the
repeal questioned whether giving a small credit ($50 under the law at the
time) was worth the administration and verification costs to the IRS. 86
The McHugh aAmendment was designed to respond to some of these
concerns. Its congressional proponents argued that it was an important (if
incremental) campaign finance reform measure, and not simply a tax
preference for members of Congress. 87 Though opponents of the
aAmendment argued that providing a credit only for congressional
candidates (and not state or local candidates) was tantamount to selfdealing, Representative McHugh presented it as a way to narrow the scope
of the credit as a cost-saving measure in an effort to keep the provision
roughly revenue-neutral. 88 At the same time, the McHugh aAmendment
doubled the dollar value of contributions claimable under the credit and
made it into a full 100% credit, thus strengthening its incentive value and
addressing the charge that the credit was too small to justify IRS
expenditures on administration and verification.89 Even as experience with
the federal credit suggested that it was not performing as well as its creators
intended, the McHugh aAmendment represented a reasonable effort to
strengthen the credit in response to criticism.
Nevertheless, opposition from some unexpected quarters raised obstacles

on Finance, 99th Cong. 68-73 (1986) (statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel (R-Minn.)) (calling the
McHugh aAmendment “a terrible case of greed and selfishness on the part of Congress”)
[hereinafter TRA Hearings]. Representative Frenzel had previously been a proponent of tax
credits, arguing that unlike direct public funding schemes, tax credits encourage civic
participation. See Tax Credits Hearings, supra note 64 (statement of Rep. Frenzel). Nine
years later, however, Frenzel expressed serious doubts about the efficacy of tax credits, and
stated that three quarters of contributions claimed under the tax credit went to incumbents.
See TRA Hearings, supra, at 68 (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (“[I]f we are all going to
sacrifice by giving up some tax preferences, it seems to me Congress ought to be willing to
give [some] up too.”).
85. See S. REP. NO. 99-313. For a discussion of the IRS data, see Smith, supra note 26,
at 81-84.
86. See S. REP. NO. 99-313.
87. See 131 CONG. REC. 35,949 (1985) (statement of Rep. McHugh) (“[W]e are offering
a modest, but very important proposal, which will give a meaningful incentive to candidates
for congressional office in the House or the Senate to go out and get more participation from
small contributors.”). The Democratic Study Group (“DSG”), a partisan think tank, was one
of the original proponents of the idea to increase the tax credit to 100% to encourage smalldonor participation and to counter the increasing role of political action committees in
political fundraising. Thomas B. Edsall, PACs Outpacing Individuals; Study Says Small
Donors Disappearing From Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1985, at A8.
88. See 131 CONG. REC. 35,949.
89. See supra notes 79, 86 and accompanying text.
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to the inclusion of the McHugh aAmendment in the TRA. In a move that
divided campaign reform advocates on the Act, Common Cause President
Fred Wertheimer and longtime campaign reform advocate Representative
David Obey (D-Wisc.) spoke out against the McHugh aAmendment before
Congress. 90 Wertheimer and Obey both argued that the McHugh
aAmendment’s expansion of the tax credit for political contributions, if
enacted on its own, would only aggravate what they saw as the greater
problem, the disproportionate political influence of PACs. According to
their argument, the practice of PACs “bundling” individual contributions to
candidatesi.e., encouraging individuals to write checks to particular
candidates, and then collecting those individual contributions and
delivering them togetherwould be subsidized by expanding the credit
without enacting additional reforms. 91 Supporters of the McHugh
aAmendment argued that its provisions addressed the bundling issue by
limiting the credit to in-state contributions and through an additional
provision that made contributions through a third party ineligible for the
credit. 92 With the campaign reform community unable to present a united
front on the merits of a tax credit for political contributions, the credit
ended up a casualty of legislative maneuvering over the TRA.
4.

The federal tax code today contains billions of dollars in tax credits

Although the most ardent proponents of tax simplification sought to
remove all forms of targeted tax incentives from the tax code in 1986, 93 the
TRA was only a small step in this direction. Even as it eliminated tax
incentives such as the tax credit for political contributions, the Act retained
and even strengthened other tax incentive programs such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit, the tax deduction for charitable contributions, and the
tax credit for rehabilitation of historic structures. 94
The next step for congressional supporters of the elimination of tax
90. Richard E. Cohen, Giving Their All, NAT’L J., Dec. 14, 1985, at 2886.
91. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Wertheimer argued that the
McHugh Amendment would make bundling a more effective tool for PACs, but that could
be a valuable piece of a broader package of reforms. TRA Hearings, supra note 84, at 17583 (1986) (statement of Fred Wertheimer, Pres., Common Cause). Representative Obey
made similar arguments to his Democratic colleagues, but also played on partisan fears,
claiming that Republicans would be able to use bundling and other sophisticated fundraising
techniques to take better advantage of an expanded tax credit. Cohen, supra note 90.
92. See Cohen, supra note 90 (quoting Richard P. Conlen, executive director of DSG).
For the text of these provisions, see 131 CONG. REC. 37,374-75 (1985).
93. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 37,446 (1985) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer (R-Tex.))
(arguing that tax credits for political contributions “put[] us even farther away from a returnfree system”).
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841 (1986).
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incentive programs was the passage of the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 (“BEA”). 95 The BEA placed restrictions on Congress’ ability to
legislate through the tax code, requiring that tax changes resulting in
revenue loss be offset by tax increases or the elimination of other tax
preferences in order to keep any such changes revenue-neutral. 96 These
“pay-as-you-go” or “PAYGO” requirements were intended to prevent the
enactment of new tax incentives from undermining the simplification of the
tax code accomplished by the TRA. 97
Even with the budgetary restrictions, however, in the early 1990s the
amount of money that the government spent through tax credits and other
“tax expenditures” quickly rose back toward the level at which it had been
prior to the TRA. 98 In the late 1990s, federal budget surplus projections
often induced Congress to bypass or waive the BEA requirements on an ad
hoc basis. 99 The politics of a budget surplus made “pay as you go” seem
less necessary, and Congress allowed the BEA requirements to expire for
most categories of expenditure in October 2002.100 Since then, the return
of federal budget deficits has led many in Congress to call for the
reinstatement of PAYGO requirements, but the politics surrounding the
issue make it unlikely that Congress will revive the requirements in the
foreseeable future. 101
95. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§Sec. 13001501, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-630 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
(1990)).
96. See id. The Office of Management and Budget was required to monitor
congressional compliance with the BEA requirements. 2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (2000). If at the
end of the session congressional tax changes resulted in a net loss to the government, the
Office was required to “sequester” (i.e., eliminate) certain expenditures according to a preestablished formula in order to eliminate the deficit increase. See id. § 902(b)(2).
97. See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 884 (2002) (arguing that “[c]odification of the
PAYGO rules in 1990 was an indication that Congress did not trust itself” to remain true to
the spirit of tax simplification underlying the TRA).
98. Gen. Accounting Office, Tax Policy: Tax Expenditures Deserve More Scrutiny,
Rep. No. GAO/GDD/AIMD-94-122, at 35-37 (1994); see also David E. Rosenbaum,
Favoring Tax Cuts and Tolerating Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A22 (“[O]ne of
the guiding principles of [President] Reagan’s tax policy, simplifying the tax code by
eliminating narrow tax breaks, was abandoned by subsequent presidents of both parties who
preferred to use tax preferences to meet various social and economic goals and satisfy
special interests.”).
99. See Exec. Office of the Pres., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2002: Analytical Perspectives 243 (2001) (“With the arrival
of budget surpluses in 1998, Congress and the [Clinton] Administration began to skirt the
budget enforcement mechanisms.”).
100. Exec. Office. of the Pres., Office. of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2004: Analytical Perspectives 315 (2003).
101. During debate over the 2005 budget, a budget amendment creating a new version of
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Despite continuing criticism from some members of Congress that the
use of targeted tax incentives is harmful to the economy, 102 the federal
government uses tax credits and similar tax preferences in many areas to
promote what it considers socially beneficial activities. In the years
following the passage of the BEA, many new tax incentives were added to
the tax code, including tax credits that benefit the disabled,103 the
environment, 104 and education. 105 In 2002, more than 40.6 million
American taxpayers claimed tax credits on their individual returns, in
amounts totaling $39 billion. 106 The vast majority of this money went to
finance three tax credits: the Child Tax Credit, which cost the government
$21.6 billion; the Foreign Tax Credit, which cost the government $5.2
billion; and the various education tax credits, which cost the government
$4.9 billion. 107 By comparison, the cost of the tax credit for political

the PAYGO requirements narrowly passed the Senate over the objections of the Bush
Administration and congressional leadership. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Raises Bar to
Enact New Tax Cuts; Rebuff to Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A24. A resolution
supporting the change failed to pass on a tie vote in the House. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush
Plans For Tax Cuts Barely Avert House Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A18.
President Bush and congressional leaders have resisted reviving the “pay-as-you-go”
principle that changes to the tax code should be revenue-neutral because it would make it
virtually impossible to make permanent major tax cuts passed in 2001 and 2003. Edmund
L. Andrews, Mutiny by 4 Republicans Over Bush’s Tax Cutting Forces Delay on Budget
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A18.
102. See, e.g., U.S. CONG. J. ECON. COMM., INEFFICIENCY OF TARGETED TAX POLICIES
(1997) (arguing that targeted tax incentives artificially lower the costs of some activities in
ways that distort the free market and cause unintended consequences that frequently
undermine their incentive value), available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/targets.htm.
103. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §Sec. 11611,
104 Stat. 1388, 1501-03 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (establishing the Disabled
Access Credit).
104. There are multiple tax credits designed to encourage environmentally friendly
activities, including credits for qualified electric vehicles and the production of energy from
renewable sources. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ Sec.
1913(b)(1), 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3019-20 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 30, 45
(2000)) (establishing tax credits for qualified electric vehicles and energy production from
certain renewable sources).
105. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §Sec. 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799806 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 25A (2000)) (establishing the Hope Scholarship Credit and the
Lifetime Learning Credit).
106. Internal Revenue Serv., Individual Income Tax Returns: Selected Income and Tax
Items for Specified Tax Years, 1985-2002 (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/02in01si.xls (last visited May 7, 2005). This data is preliminary data only, revised by
the Internal Revenue Service as of May 2004. Id.
107. Id. Not included amongst these numbers is the Earned Income Credit, which unlike
most tax credits offered by the federal government is refundablei.e., claimants are entitled
to a refund of any credit amount in excess of the claimant’s tax liability. See id.
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contributions was only $269.8 million in its peak year of 1980.108
B.

Political contribution incentives at the state level

The design of the original federal tax credit for political contributions
limited its effectiveness. Experience with political contribution incentive
programs, however, is not limited to the federal level. Many states have
implemented their own version of a tax credit for political contributions,
including Oregon, Arkansas, Ohio, and Virginia. 109 Meanwhile, Minnesota
takes a slightly different approach, operating a Political Contribution
Refund (“PCR”) program outside of its tax system. 110 Recent experience
with incentive programs for small-dollar political contributions at the state
level suggests several ways in which the design of an incentive program
can be tailored to promote small-donor participation in political campaigns
more effectively.
1.

Details of the state programs

Oregon has the oldest of the current state political contribution incentive
programs, having provided a tax credit for political contributions in some
form since 1969. 111 The Oregon tax credit has also has had the highest
participation rate of any state’s political contribution incentive program,
with an average of 4.5% of its taxpayers participating per year during the
1990s. 112 After the TRA repealed the federal tax credit in 1986, Oregon
increased the coverage of its credit from 50% to 100% for contributions up
to $50 (or $100 for joint returns) to federal, state, and local candidates,
parties, and PACs. 113 In 1994, Oregon voters passed Measure 9, 114 a ballot
initiative championed by OSPIRG the Oregon Public Interest Research
Group and other reform groups that set low contribution limits for state
candidates, parties, and PACs 115 and made tax credits for contributions

108. See Statistics of Income Bulletin (Fall 1985), supra note 70. At that time, the
political contributions credit was only a 50% tax credit for the first $50 of an individual’s
contributions ($100 for joint returns). See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
109. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 27.
110. Arizona also has a tax credit for political contributions, but unlike those discussed
here, the credit is not available for contributions to candidates, but instead only applies to
contributions made to the state’s nonpartisan Clean Elections Fund. For a discussion of the
Arizona credit, see Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 56-60.
111. Id. at 24. For a discussion of the creation of Oregon’s tax credit in 1969, see
ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 194.
112. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 26.
113. 1987 Or. Laws 470-71.
114. 1995 Or. Laws 1-11.
115. Id. at 3. Measure 9 limited individual and PAC contributions to $500 for candidates
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available only for candidates who agreed to abide by voluntary spending
limits. 116 The Measure 9 provisions were in effect for only a few years
before the Oregon Supreme Court struck down its contribution limits
because they violated the “free expression” clause of the Oregon
The absence of contribution limits undermined
Constitution. 117
participation in the tax credit program as many candidates chose to decline
credit-eligible contributions to avoid consenting to spending limits.118 In
response to the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision, the state legislature
restored the tax credit’s availability for the first $50 (or $100 for joint
returns) of contributions to all federal, state, and local candidates, parties,
and PACs. 119
In 1996, Arkansas voters passed Initiated Act 1, which establishes a tax
credit that reimburses 100% of an individual’s first $50 ($100 for joint
returns) in contributions to state candidates, parties, and PACs. 120 The Act
also established a series of low contribution limits for state
campaigns$300 for statewide executive offices such as governor and
secretary of state and $100 for state legislative and judicial officesand
for statewide office and $100 for candidates for the state legislature, parties, and PACs. Id.
116. Id. at 9-10. Measure 9 set different voluntary spending limits for the primary and
general election. Id. at 5. In the primary, candidates for governor could spend no more than
$500,000; candidates for other statewide office could spend no more than $200,000;
candidates for state senator could spend no more than $30,000; and candidates for state
representative could spend no more than $20,000. Id. The limits were set at double these
amounts for each office in the general election. Id. In addition to being ineligible for tax
credit-reimbursed contributions, candidates who did not agree to limit their spending had a
statement to that effect placed next to their names in the official voter pamphlet. Id. at 6-7.
117. VanNatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (Or. 1997). The Oregon Supreme Court’s
holding was on independent state law grounds, as the Court interpreted the state
constitutional guarantee in an even stricter fashion than the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the First Amendment. See id. at 775-76 (rejecting Buckley v. Valeo’s
reasoning that restrictions on contributions are less threatening to freedom of expression
than restrictions on expenditures). The Court rejected, however, a similar claim that
Measure 9’s voluntary spending limits violated the “free expression” clause. Id. at 787-89.
The Court found that neither the linkage of tax credit eligibility to acceptance of the
spending limits nor the voter pamphlet statement of candidate compliance with the limits
was sufficiently coercive as to place an impermissible burden on candidates’ speech. Id.
118. See Smith, supra note 26, at 79-80. In 1996, when Measure 9’s contribution limits
were still in effect, 95.8% of primary election candidates and 83.75% of general election
candidates agreed to spending limits. Id. In 1998, after the Oregon Supreme Court had
struck down the contribution limits, only 61.4% of primary election candidates and 10.31%
of general election candidates agreed to spending limits. Id. These statistics demonstrate
that the success of Measure 9’s voluntary spending limits depended on its low contribution
limits to give candidates a reason not to opt out of the system. Evidently, the lure of raising
and spending campaign funds in unlimited amounts was too great for 89.69% of Oregon’s
candidates in the 1998 general election.
119. S.B. 369, 1999 Or. Laws 999 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 316.102 (2001)).
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-222 (Michie 2000).

CMARCHRISTENSEN

122

2/3/2011 10:02 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXII

empowered local governments to set low contribution limits for their own
races. 121 The low contribution limits applied both to contributions from
individuals to ordinary PACs and to contributions from ordinary PACs to
candidates. 122 Perhaps the most innovative provision of Initiated Act 1,
however, was its creation of a new kind of political entity, the small donor
PAC. 123 Small donor PACs, which could also accept credit-eligible
contributions, operated under a different set of rules than regular PACs: in
return for only accepting contributions from individuals of $25 or less,
small donor PACs could give up to $2500 in contributions to a
candidate. 124 Initiated Act 1’s low contribution limits, tax credits for
political contributions, and favorable treatment of small donor PACs were
clearly designed to give average Americans a greater opportunity to
participate in political campaigns and to force candidates to engage in a
style of campaigning that was more responsive to grassroots constituencies
from across the political spectrum. 125
Opponents of Initiated Act 1, including the Associated Industries of
Arkansas PAC, challenged its provisions in federal court. 126 In 1998, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision that struck down the
Act’s contribution limits as well as a pre-Act contribution limit of $200 for
contributions from individuals to PACs. 127 The court reinstated the state’s
prior limit of $1000 for contributions from individuals and PACs to
candidates and also reduced the contribution limit for small donor PACs

121. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 51.
122. Graham F. Sloan, Ark. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Op. No. 98-EC-017 (Aug. 27,
1998), available at http://www.arkansasethics.com/opinions/98-EC-017.htm.
123. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 51. According to a survey of state campaign
finance laws done by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the only other state that
creates a special classification for small donor PACs is Colorado. Nat’l Conf. of State
Legis.,
Limits
on
PAC
Contributions
to
Candidates,
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/PACCand.htm (last visited May 7, 2005).
124. Sloan, supra note 122.
125. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 51-52 (quoting Scott Trotter, author of Initiated
Act 1, stating that “[t]he whole idea is to bring a lot more small contributors into the process
and reduce the influence of big contributors.”).
126. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998).
127. See id. (holding that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that low
contribution limits were necessary to support Arkansas’s interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption). The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the First
Amendment was later seriously undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v.
Shrink Misourri Government PAC, which upheld a similar initiative passed in Missouri that
established low contribution limits. 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri contribution
limits of $1000 for constitutional offices and $250 for other offices, indexed for inflation).
Thus, if Arkansas were to enact Initiated Act 1’s low contribution limits again today, a
federal court would likely find them constitutionally acceptable.
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from $2500 to $1000 to align it with that of ordinary PACs. 128 In the
aftermath of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, then, individuals are no longer
limited in the amount that they can give to ordinary PACs, and while small
donor PACs still exist, they can no longer contribute more to candidates
than can ordinary PACs. In eliminating these advantages over ordinary
PACs, the Eighth Circuit seriously undermined the ability of states to
provide for small donor PACs that empower small donors vis-à-vis the
large-dollar contributors who have historically dominated campaign
finance. 129
Initiated Act 1’s tax credit for political contributions no longer serves the
same purpose following the modification of the law by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Whereas the tax credit was originally intended to
provide an incentive for small donors to make contributions to increase the
pool of money available to candidates as a complement to the Act’s low
contribution limits,130 it now may be used to reimburse portions of
contributions to candidates up to $1000, or contributions to ordinary PACs
for any amount.
Ohio and Virginia also offer tax credits for political contributions, but
neither state’s credit program includes parties, PACs, or federal candidates.
Ohio provides a 100% tax credit for the first $50 (or $100 for joint returns)
in contributions to state candidates.131 Ohio law limits individual and PAC
contributions to candidates to $2500, individual and PAC contributions to
parties to $5000 for county parties and $15,000 for state parties, and
128. Russell, 146 F.3d at 568-72. The court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment required parity between the amount an ordinary PAC and a
small donor PAC were allowed to contribute to candidates, even though after the court’s
decision ordinary PACs were able to receive unlimited contributions from wealthy donors
while small donor PACs would still exist as entities that collected contributions in amounts
of $25 or less. See id. at 572.
129. See Zach Polett, Empower Citizens, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1997 (describing the
aims
of
Initiated
Act
1’s
proponents),
available
at
http://bostonreview.net/BR22.2/polett.html. According to the director of national political
operations for the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”),
one of the groups whose organizing and lobbying efforts helped to pass Initiated Act 1,
[w]hat makes the small-donor PAC particularly effective as a campaign finance
reform tool is its combination with the contribution limits of the initiative. Under
the initiative, regular PACs and individuals can contribute no more than $100 per
election to a candidate (or $300 for a statewide race) while small-donor PACs are
allowed to contribute up to $2,500. Thus small-donor PACs empower small
donors while decreasing the power of traditional, large-donor PACs. They also
have the advantage of putting more money into the system, thus answering one of
the objections raised to relatively low contribution limits.
Id.
130. See id.
131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.29 (Anderson 2002).
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individual contributions to PACs to $5000.132 Virginia offers a 50% credit
on the first $25 (or $50 for joint returns) of contributions to state and local
candidates during the year they are up for election.133 Virginia law does
not limit contributions to candidates or PACs.134
In 1992, Minnesota created its PCR program, which offers refunds for
100% of contributions up to $50 per person to political parties and
candidates who agree to abide by spending limits. 135 The program is
administered outside of the tax system, with refunds issued typically within
four to six weeks after the contributor submits an official receipt to the
state’s Department of Revenue. 136 The Minnesota legislature enacted the
contribution refund program as a supplement to its system of partial public
financing, which had been in existence since 1974.137 Participation in the
public funding system in Minnesota is high, and public funds represent a
significant portion of total campaign funds used by candidates; in 2002,
approximately 25% of all candidate funds came from direct public
financing. 138 Like PCR money, these public funds are available to
candidates only if they abide by spending limits. 139 The spending limits
are adjusted periodically for inflation; in 2002, spending limits were set at
$27,380 for candidates for state representative, $54,740 for candidates for
the state senate, $182,350 for candidates for secretary of state and state
auditor, $364,690 for candidates for attorney general, and $2,188,090 for
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor. 140 First-time candidates
receive a 10% increase in their spending limit. 141 Candidates who win in a

132. Id. § 3517.102.
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.6 (Michie 2000).
134. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 62.
135. MINN. STAT. § 290.06(23) (2002).
136. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 36.
137. See Graham P. Ramsden & Patrick D. Donnay, The Impact of Minnesota’s Political
Contribution Refund Program on Small-Donor Behavior in State House Races, 33 STATE &
LOCAL GOV’T REV. 32, 32-34 (2001) (detailing history of PCR’s enactment), available at
http://www.cviog.uga.edu/slgr/2001ac.pdf.
138. See Minn. Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd., 2002 Campaign Finance Summary
(reporting total contributions and total public subsidies received by state candidates in
2002), at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/Summary02/CFSUMM2002.pdf (last visited May
7, 2005).
139. MINN. STAT. § 10A.322 (2002).
140. Id. § 10A.25(2). In 2004, only members of the Minnesota House of Representatives
wereare up for election. The 2004 spending limit for candidates for this office is $28,400.
Minn. Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd., 2004 Contribution and Expenditure Limits, at
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/contltey.htm (last visited Apr.il 3, 2005).
141. MINN. STAT. § 10A.25(2)(d) (2002). Minnesota law defines a first-time candidate as
“a candidate who is running for that office for the first time and who has not run previously
for any other office whose territory now includes a population that is more than one-third of
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contested primary election may spend 120% of their spending limits. 142 In
non-election years, spending limits are set at 20% of election-year limits.143
Studies have suggested that Minnesota’s system of campaign finance
regulation has resulted in more competitive elections in the state than
would have taken place under a system of regulations patterned after the
federal model. 144
2.

Comparing effects of different state programs

As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in the first half of the twentieth century,
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” 145 Brandeis’s laboratory metaphor is apt for a discussion of
political contribution incentives. In particular, the Minnesota and Oregon
political contribution incentive programs serve as instructive case studies
that suggest ways in which a new federal incentive program for political
contributions might be structured.
Those states that have offered tax credits without any additional reforms
have largely replicated the federal experience. Ohio, Arkansas, and
Virginia all have credits that essentially stand on their own as methods of
encouraging citizen involvement in political campaigns. Although their
relatively recent enactment means that data is limited, the three states’
The
programs have all experienced modest participation rates.146

the population in the territory of the new office.” Id.
142. Id. § 10A.25(5). A candidate qualifies for the contested primary spending bonus if
the candidate “received fewer than twice as many votes as any one of the candidate’s
opponents in [the] primary . . . .” Id.
143. Id. § 10A.25(6). Contribution limits in Minnesota are similarly structured.
Individual contribution limits during election years are set at $500 for state legislative
campaigns, $1000 for the attorney general’s campaign, and $2000 for campaigns for
governor and lieutenant governor. Id. § 10A.27. During non-election years, these limits are
set at $100, $200, and $500, respectively. Id. Any contribution or expenditure over $100
from a corporation or other association must come from a segregated political fund. Id. §
10A.12.
144. See KENNETH R. MAYER, CITIZENS RES. FOUND., U. OF SO. CAL., PUBLIC FINANCING
AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN 17 (1998) (arguing that the
Minnesota system has resulted in “state legislative elections . . . [that] are vigorously
contested, with voters offered viable alternatives in nearly every race”); Patrick D. Donnay
& Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections: Lessons from Minnesota,
20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 351, 351-64 (1995) (finding that the Minnesota system of public
financing helps challengers more than incumbents in state legislative elections, making them
more competitive).
145. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
146. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 48-49, 53.
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programs’ effects on small donor participation are less clear. In the early
years of the Ohio tax credit, the program’s participation rate has never
exceeded 0.5%, and the number of small-dollar contributions has changed
only slightly. 147 Data from Arkansas and Virginia tell similar stories,
though these states have newer credit programs that preclude drawing statespecific conclusions. As with the old federal credit and the Ohio credit,
political contribution incentives in these two states have shown modest
participation rates.148
Unlike other political contribution incentive programs, the structure of
the Minnesota PCR program encourages parties and candidates to actively
solicit small-dollar contributions. The state gives official receipt books to
candidates and parties, who then offer the receipts to donors to submit with
their refund applications. 149 With refunds issued year-round, candidates
can promise prospective donors a refund in a matter of weeks, enhancing
their fundraising efforts. 150 Moreover, since the contribution refunds are
only available for donations to those candidates who abide by spending
limits and receive a large portion of their campaign budget from public
funds, 151 candidates whose appeal is primarily to grassroots constituencies,
regardless of party or ideology, have more of an opportunity to compete on
a level playing field.
The Minnesota PCR program reduces an eligible donor’s costs of
making a political contribution to a greater degree than traditional tax
credits because it operates as a refund rather than as a traditional tax credit.
In studying what motivates individual donors to make political
contributions, political scientists have found strong evidence that the
likelihood that an individual will make a political contribution is almost
entirely dependent on his or her family’s income level.152 Even more so
147. Id. at 48-49. In the four-year cycle following the introduction of Ohio’s tax credit
for political contributions, contributions of $50 or less to campaigns for statewide offices
rose less than 5%. Id. More recent data on the efficacy of the Ohio tax credit has been
gathered by the Campaign Finance Institute, which surveyed Ohio citizens and found that
public education about the program could lead to a substantially greater participation rate.
See infra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
148. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 53 (finding that “[t]he Arkansas tax credit is
getting more popular but remains . . . a minor piece of the campaign finance system” that
has not had a significant impact on state elections); id. at 63 (finding that the Virginia credit
has had only “a tiny financial impact on campaign finances” and has had no demonstrable
effect on small-dollar contributions).
149. Id. at 36.
150. See id. at 42-43.
151. MINN. STAT. § 290.06(23) (2002).
152. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 361 (1995) (“[I]n accounting for
the volume of contributions to politics, family income is, overwhelmingly, the dominant
factor. To give money one needs money and, apparently, little else.”).
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than a traditional tax credit, a program like Minnesota’s designed to
reimburse small donors for their political contributions within weeks after
they are made has the potential to make an individual’s likelihood to
contribute to a campaign less dependent on his or her ability to do so.
One recent study by a Harvard University student suggests that
contributions to candidates made under the Minnesota PCR program are
not predominantly determined by the income level of the candidate’s
supporters. 153 Based on a detailed analysis of contribution refund program
data, 154 the study found that the income level of some candidates’ districts
actually showed a slight negative relationship to the candidates’ ability to
raise PCR program funds. 155 According to the study, the data shows that
characteristics of the candidate, rather than characteristics of the district,
are the crucial determinants of a candidate’s PCR fundraising ability.156
For example, a candidate’s status as an incumbent and success at raising
non-PCR funds show strong relationships to his or her success at raising
PCR donations. 157 In other words, the study suggests that Minnesota PCR
donations depend almost entirely on a candidate’s own efforts to solicit
contributions rather than on the income level of the candidate’s supporters.
Further study of the Minnesota experience is necessary to clarify the effects
that the refund program has had on political giving in the state.
The Minnesota PCR program was introduced to supplement a system of
public financing that had already shown moderate success in enabling more
competitive elections. Studies on the effects of the contribution refund on
small-donor participation in Minnesota suggest that the refund program has

153. Smith, supra note 26, at 97-118.
154. More detailed conclusions about patterns of donor behavior are possible for
Minnesota’s PCR program than for federal or state tax credits because in operating the
contribution refund program outside of its tax system, Minnesota tracks a different set of
credit usage data than does the IRS or most other states. Instead of recording the income
class of those who take advantage of the credit, Minnesota maintains data on which
candidates and parties are recipients of the funds, and in what amounts. Id. at 73-74. This
more detailed set of data allows for more sophisticated analyses of donor behavior than are
possible using only aggregate taxation statistics. Id. at 108-18.
155. See id. at 115 (finding that, in the 1996 election cycle, the income level of a state
senate candidate had a negative correlation with the amount of PCR money he or she
raised). This was the case even though, in their mobilization efforts in Minnesota,
Republicanswho are generally assumed to be the party favored by the wealthyhave
taken much fuller advantage of the contribution refund program than the Democrats have.
Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 39-42.
156. Smith, supra note 26, at 112.
157. Id. at 116. Party affiliation also plays a major role, as the Republican Party in
Minnesota has been much more effective than the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party at
mobilizing its donor base to take advantage of the contribution refund program. Id. at 10708.
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had a similarly moderate, but measurable, effect on donor behavior.158
Between 1990 and 1998, contributions of less than $100 increased from
34.3% to 39.2% of the average candidate’s budget, with effects being
In open-seat races,
particularly pronounced in open-seat races. 159
contributions of less than $100 rose from 28.9% to 48.9% of the total
receipts of Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidates, and from 30.9% to 41.3%
of the total receipts of Republican candidates.160
Despite these measurable effects, the contribution refund program’s
overall participation rate is still relatively low. One study suggests that
participation averages slightly less than 4% of potential donors during
election years and slightly less than 3% during off years. 161 Although
participation rates have remained flat, the amount of money paid out by the
state through the program has increased steadily as the average size of the
refund has increased, rising from $7.5 million in the 1996 election cycle to
more than $9 million in the 2000 election cycle. 162
Perhaps the most notable “success story” for the Minnesota PCR
programand indeed, for political contribution incentive programs
generallywas the election of Reform Party candidate Jesse Ventura as
Governor of Minnesota in 1998. Governor Ventura’s success was widely
attributed to the effectiveness of his appeal to grassroots supporters. 163
The contribution refund program was instrumental to this appeal. Even
after he was elected governor, Ventura promoted participation in the
program actively throughout his fundraising efforts with such slogans as
“Help Fund the Governor’s Grass Roots Volunteer Organization and Get
Your Money Back!” 164 Governor Ventura argued that the contribution
refund program was essential to his fundraising efforts because he refused
to accept PAC donations: “The underlying goal of the publicly funded PCR
program is to make it unnecessary for candidates to accept large
contributions from individual donors and lobbying groups by providing
candidates with enough small contributions to adequately finance their

158. See Ramsden & Donnay, supra note 137, at 38-39.
159. See id. at 38.
160. Id. at 39.
161. See Smith, supra note 26, at 97 (estimating contribution refund participation rates
for the years 1994 to 1999). The author estimates that contribution refund participation was
3.73% in 1994, 2.86% in 1995, 4.05% in 1996, 2.76% in 1997, 3.79% in 1998, and 2.97% in
1999. Id.
162. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 38.
163. E.g., Dane Smith & Robert Whereatt, Ventura Wins; Populist Campaign Brings Out
Throngs of Young Voters, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Nov. 4, 1998, at 1A.
164. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 42-43.
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campaigns.” 165 Ventura’s promotion of the Minnesota contribution refund
program was particularly prominent on his web site, where he devoted
most of his main fundraising page and an entire additional page to the
refund. 166
Governor Ventura’s emphasis on PCR contributions was not merely
rhetorical. During his 1998 campaign he was able to raise PCR funds at a
comparable rate to that of his major party opponents. Ventura raised
$177,658 in PCR funds in 1998, which was only slightly less than the
$181,089 raised by Democratic candidate Skip Humphrey, and actually
exceeded the $175,937 raised by Republican Norm Coleman. 167 This
fundraising success, when combined with the operation of Minnesota’s
other election laws such as voluntary spending limits and direct public
funding, 168 as well as access to debates, 169 enabled Governor Ventura to
overcome obstacles to competing with the major party candidates and
ultimately to win the election.
The unique history of political contribution incentives in Oregon
provides additional insight into ways in which lawmakers can design a
more effective political contributions incentive program. Oregon’s brief
experience with linking its tax credit for political contributions to voluntary
spending limits reveals some of the effects that different regulatory
structures can have on the efficacy of political contribution incentives.
During the brief period when Measure 9’s low contribution limits and
voluntary spending limits were both in effect, political contribution
incentive program participation rates for the wealthiest income classes fell
sharply, while participation rates for the two lowest income classes rose
slightly. 170 This effect suggests that, as in Minnesota, adoption of a system
that combines low contribution limits with political contribution incentives
linked to voluntary spending limits creates a political environment that is
more open to candidates whose strength lies in appealing to large numbers
165. Id. at 43.
166. Id.
167. PETER S. WATTSON, COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS ANNUAL
CONFERENCE, HOW MINNESOTA’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW HELPED ELECT A THIRD-PARTY
GOVERNOR
10
(Dec.
8,
1999),
available
at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/treatise/cogel-jesse.pdf.
168. See id. at 9-12 (arguing that restrictiveons spending limits placed on Ventura’s
opponents, access to general account public funding available to all candidates who received
over 5% of the vote, and permissive election laws that made it easier for minor party
candidates to access the ballot and for new voters to register on election day, were all
necessary factors in Ventura’s election).
169. See Smith & Whereatt, supra note 163, at 1A (reporting that Ventura, as a “plain
speaker of homespun wisdom,” was “by consensus, the star of most of the debates”).
170. Smith, supra note 26, at 142-43.
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of small donors. Oregon’s data set is too limited to draw any definite
conclusionsonly in the 1996 election was there a high level of
participation in Measure 9’s voluntary spending limitsbut, at the same
time, the data is in some ways more instructive than Minnesota’s data in
that one can witness the effects of a change in the governing law.
Oregon has the highest participation rate in the country for a political
contribution incentive program, and in large measure this is due to the state
providing the credit for contributions to PACs as well as candidates and
parties. 171 Many PACs solicit credit-eligible contributions aggressively,
promoting the credit as a central aspect of their fundraising appeal.172 The
result is that in recent electoral cycles, a substantial portion of contributions
on which a tax credit was claimed went to PACs rather than to parties or
candidates. 173 These results are consistent with data from Minnesota’s
contribution refund program. Both cases suggest that political contribution
incentive programs are more likely to be successful in changing donor
behavior if the backdrop of campaign finance regulations against which
they operate also includes incentives for potential contribution recipients to
promote the credit’s usage. Further study is needed to clarify why PACs in
Oregon are so much better positioned than candidates and parties to solicit
credit-eligible contributions. 174 Data from Oregon suggests, however, that
Oregon’s higher participation rate is driven by the mobilization efforts of
contribution recipients. 175
If the higher participation in the Oregon tax credit is largely attributable
to the mobilization efforts of PACs, why has the Arkansas credit not shown
similar effects? Like Oregon, Arkansas allows PACs (including small
donor PACs) to receive credit-eligible contributions. Anecdotal evidence
suggests, however, that the Arkansas credit is the victim of a widespread
lack of awareness, even among political insiders.176 While Oregon’s tax
credit has been around since 1969, Arkansas’ credit was only enacted in
171. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 29-32.
172. See id. at 30-31 (quoting literature from Oregon Right to Life and Oregon Gun
Owners’ Political Victory Fund).
173. See id. at 29 (“Comparing tax credit data from the Oregon Department of Revenue
and contribution data from the National Institute for Money in State Politics, it appears that
the most tax credits are being claimed on contributions to organizations besides candidate
and party campaigns.”).
174. For a discussion of some reasons why PACs may have stronger incentives to use the
tax credit to solicit small-dollar contributions, see infra text accompanying note 219.
175. Smith, supra note 26, at 142-44.
176. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 54-55 (“The Arkansas political establishment has
not embraced or, in some cases, even acknowledged the credit for political contributions as
a viable fundraising mechanism.”). One political party leader was not even aware that the
credit applied to donations to political parties. See id. at 54.
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1996. Moreover, the Arkansas credit was enacted as part of a much
broader initiative, most of which was struck down as unconstitutional by
the courts. 177 Indeed, the very PACs that might otherwise have been early
supporters of the tax credit were opponents of Initiated Act 1 because it
subjected them to low contribution limits.178 According to the author of
Initiated Act 1, after large portions of the Act were struck down, the tax
credit’s focus on small contributions was undermined. 179 While campaign
literature often refers to the credit, these references are mainly limited to
“small print disclaimers.”180 The turbulent history surrounding the
enactment of the Arkansas credit seems to have handicapped its early
success in increasing the role of small donors in state and local politics.
Further study of the differences between the Arkansas and Oregon credits
and the role of PACs in Arkansas and Oregon is needed to clarify why
PACs in Oregon have mobilized around tax credits for political
contributions so effectively.
Minnesota and Oregon have provided useful “laboratories” for
examining the effects of political contribution incentive programs under
different circumstances.181 In the next Part, the state PIRGs will propose a
structure for a new federal incentive program for political contributions that
builds on this experience.

177. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
179. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 55 (quoting Scott Trotter, former Executive
Director of Common Cause Arkansas).
180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Another valuable source of data on political contribution incentive programs is
Canada, which offers a 75% tax credit for contributions to political parties. See CAMPAIGN
FIN. INST., PARTICIPATION, COMPETITION, ENGAGEMENT: HOW TO REVIVE AND IMPROVE
PUBLIC FUNDING FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS 80-82 (2003), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/presidential/report/index.html. Canada has offered a tax credit for
political contributions since 1974. Id. In 2003, the Canadian Parliament passed legislation
that raised the amount of the credit from $500 to $650. An Act to Amend the Canada
Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, ch. 19, 2003 S.C. C-24 (Can.). Although a
comprehensive comparative study of Canada’s campaign finance system is beyond the
scope of this Article, the Campaign Finance Institute’s research suggests that Canada’s tax
credit has significantly increased the role of small donors in funding political parties. See
CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., supra, at 82 (finding that since the tax credit was introduced, the
average contributions to political parties has generally declined while the numbers of both
individual contributors and claimants of the tax credit increased). Further study of the
Canadian experience is needed to determine what lessons Americans should draw from it.
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II. CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVE PPROGRAMS CCAN BBE PPART OF A
CCOMPREHENSIVE, LLONG-TTERM SSTRATEGY FOR CCAMPAIGN
FFINANCE RREFORM
A.

Vouchers: One Possible Future

A political contribution incentive program can only empower individuals
to participate on equal terms in the funding of political campaigns if
participation in the program is determined solely by individual choice, so
that donors are not forced to bear opportunity costs that lower-income
citizens will be less able to afford. One way to construct such an ideal
program would be to administer political contribution incentives through a
voucher system.
The idea of creating a voucher system to distribute public funding to
candidates is not new. Senators Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.) 182 and Russell
Long (D-La.) 183 each proposed a campaign finance voucher program in
1967. Both proposals were introduced in response to criticism of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966.184 That Act had
established a tax check-off for public financing of presidential campaigns,
but Congress had subsequently voted to delay the Act’s implementation
while it considered further proposals for reform. 185 Both voucher
proposals considered in the Senate in 1967 would have retained the element
of a tax check-off that allowed taxpayers to earmark $1 for financing
political campaigns, but would have given individuals a more potent
political contribution incentive by having the government send them a
voucher that they could remit to the candidate of their choice (instead of
their $1 going into a general fund for all candidates, as under conventional
tax check-off programs). 186 The voucher proposals were thus like tax
check-off proposals, because individuals would not have been required to
lay out any of their own money up front, but they were also like tax credits,
because individuals would have been given the power to choose the
recipients of the funds.

182. Federal Elections Campaign Financing Act, S. 1390, 90th Cong. (1967); see also
DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN
FINANCING IN AMERICA 189 (1975) (evaluating Metcalf’s proposal).
183. Presidential Election Campaign Assistance Act, S. 1698, 90th Cong. (1967).
184. Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539.
185. See Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57; Political Campaign
Financing Proposals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong. 60-63
(1967) [hereinafter Campaign Financing Proposals Hearings] (summarizing ten10
proposed reforms before the Senate Finance Committee in 1967).
186. See ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 182, at 189.
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The Metcalf and Long proposals differed in both scope and accessibility.
Senator Metcalf’s plan would have expanded both the scope and effect of
the tax check-off, giving taxpayers the choice to receive two $1 vouchers:
one each for use in congressional and presidential campaigns. 187 The
Metcalf vouchers would not have been accessible to all Americans at all
times, however, as they would only have been available to those taxpayers
who had sufficient tax liability in the year preceding the election for which
the voucher would have been issued. 188
Compared to the Metcalf proposal, the Long proposal on the one hand
was more limited in scope, but on the other hand was more progressive.
Senator Long’s bill would have created “Presidential Election Campaign
Certificates” but made no provision for congressional races.189 Unlike in
the Metcalf bill, however, under Senator Long’s plan the government
would have automatically sent vouchers to all individuals who filed taxes
in the year preceding the election, and made a voucher available to any
other individual (including resident aliens) who requested it.190 Thus,
while it applied only to presidential campaigns, Senator Long’s proposal
was the first legislative attempt to enact political contribution incentives
outside of the tax code, making them potentially available to all Americans.
Ultimately, however, the Senate acted on neither 1967 voucher proposal.
Some Senators who supported vouchers in principle raised questions about
how easily they could be administered, and political momentum at the time
was clearly behind first creating some form of tax incentive. 191 After
several years of additional debate and legislative maneuvering, the tax
credit and tax check-off each became law separately as the two titles of the
Pastore aAmendment to the Revenue Act of 1971. 192
Although Congress has not considered a campaign finance voucher
proposal since 1967, the concept has remained alive in academic circles. In
their seminal 1975 text Political Money, David Adamany and George
Agree used the Metcalf plan as a starting point for developing their own
proposal for a voucher system that applied to both presidential and

187. S. 1390 § 2.
188. Id. Thus, during presidential off-years only congressional vouchers would have
been issued. Id.
189. Presidential Election Campaign Assistance Act, S. 1698, 90th Cong. § 102 (1967).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Campaign Financing Proposals Hearings, supra note 185, at 242-67
(1967) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.)) (arguing, inter alia, that tax credits
were easier to administer than the proposed Metcalf voucher system).
192. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text;. sSee also 117 CONG. REC. 41,947
(1971) (statement of Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.)) (arguing that the Pastore aAmendment’s
presidential tax check-off should be extended to non-taxpayers through a voucher system).
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congressional elections. 193 In recent years other proposals for using a
voucher system for the public financing of federal elections have circulated
through legal academia. 194 The most compelling of these proposals was
put forward by Yale Law Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres in
their recently-published book, Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for
Campaign Finance. 195

193. ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 182, at 189-99. In their discussion of voucher
proposals, Adamany and Agree ultimately decided to modify their voucher plan so that it
was no longer a true political contribution incentive program. Instead of each voucher being
worth a certain amount of money that would be given to the candidate chosen by each
citizen, under the Adamany and Agree plan citizens would first donate their vouchers to
candidates, then a complicated formula would be applied to determine how much public
money each candidate would be given based on the number of vouchers the candidate had
collected. Id. at 196-99. The formula’s most salient feature was a ceiling of 38% of total
popular support; any percentage of total vouchers a candidate received above this threshold
would not have resulted in additional funds. Id. at 196-98. Adamany and Agree adopted
this formula to prevent a lopsided distribution of campaign subsidies. With the 38% ceiling,
even presidential candidates Barry Goldwater and George McGovern, who suffered
landslide defeats to Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon,, respectively, would have received
the same amount of public funding as their opponents (assuming, somewhat questionably,
that the voucher distribution would have tracked general election results). Id. at 200.
Adamany and Agree argued that designing a system that would provide rough parity in
funding among major candidates was essential to guarantee to voters “a full and fair
presentation of alternatives.” Id. at 190.
Adding a complicated formula for how funds are distributed, however, is directly
contrary to the principles that support the creation of a system of political contribution
incentives; political contribution incentives empower individual acts of participation by
linking the distribution of funds directly to popular support. Moreover, attempts to second
guess the public by allowing it only an indirect say over how public funds are distributed
leave open many of the same opportunities for major party entrenchment that plague the
existing system of direct grants of public money to presidential campaigns. See, e.g., Tax
Credits Hearings, supra note 64 (statement of Prof. Roy Schotland, Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctr.) (arguing that forms of public funding other than political contribution incentives
necessarily involve formulae for distributing the funds that will unfairly discriminate against
some group of candidates); see also Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:
An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7
(1996) (arguing that “the voucher plan does a better job of both minimizing the impact of
wealth on the political system and of empowering those individuals lacking political capital”
than other forms of public financing).
194. See Hasen, supra note 193, at 29-44 (arguing that a voucher system would create a
more equitable political order and that it would have a realistic chance of becoming law and
passing constitutional muster); see generally Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994) (arguing
that a constitutional principle of equal-dollars-per-voter should be establishedeither by
amendment or reinterpretationthat would require a closed system of campaign funds such
as a voucher plan).
195. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) [hereinafter ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS].
Professor Ackerman had discussed his ideas for creating a voucher system of public
financing in previous works, but Voting With Dollars is the first detailed elaboration of his
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In Voting With Dollars, Ackerman and Ayres propose to send to all
registered voters an ATM-like “Patriot card” containing fifty “Patriot
dollars” that would be transferable to the candidate(s) of their choice. 196 Of
that money, $10 would be set aside for House races, $15 for Senate races,
and $25 for the presidential race. 197 Donations to parties and PACs would
also be allowed; the authors see these political agents as “brokers” whom
individuals may choose to entrust with their Patriot dollars so that they can
be put to their most effective use.198
Ackerman and Ayres postulate that, even as market forces create more
competitive elections by channeling Patriot dollars to where they are most
in demand, the operation of the market will have the secondary effect of

proposal. See Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign
Finance, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 71; Bruce Ackerman, The Patriot Option, BOSTON
REV., Apr./May 1997, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR22.2/ackerman.html..
196. See generally ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195. The
“new paradigm” referred to in the work’s title includes both the voucher proposal and a
proposal that contribution limits be greatly increased but that all contributions be made
anonymously. See id. at 9. The common thread between these two proposals is an analogy
to the voting booth. In the authors’ view, the voucher system guarantees political equality
among all citizensanalogous to constitutional principles of one person, one votewhile
the anonymity rules address corruption concerns by creating an “anonymous donation
booth” analogous to the secret ballot. See id. at 25.
Although the authors treat the two aspects of their proposal as if they were crucially
linked, many commentators have argued that the two proposals should be evaluated
separately. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting With Dollars,
91 CAL. L. REV. 705, 705 (2003) (“If . . . Voting With Dollars . . . were an Olympic event, it
would be the biathlon . . . [which] combines two sports that are usually quite distinct from
one another.”). Moreover, once one defines political equality as the primary concern of
campaign finance reform, measures such as anonymity for all private contributions that are
aimed at fighting corruption become less necessary. After all, bribery statutes and related
laws already make actual corruption illegal. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2005) (defining
crimes of bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest for public officials). Although fears that
the appearance of corruption harms the American political process are real, such fears are
often exaggerated by those who argue that the regulation of deals between legislators and
their constituents, rather than political equality, should be the central concern of campaign
finance reform. See infra text accompanying notes 212-224. In defining the problem of
campaign finance reform as one of political equality, this Article focuses solely on the
voucher proposal of Professors Ackerman and Ayres while ignoring their proposed
anonymity requirements.
197. ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 76-78. The
authors further provide that when an incumbent president is running for reelection, the
presidential money pool must be split with $10 for the primary and $15 for the general
election; no similar provisions are made for congressional or open-seat presidential
elections. Id. at 79-82.
198. See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Why a New Paradigm?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV.
1147, 1177 (2003) (“The activities of these ‘Patriotic brokers’ will vastly increase the
number of effective challenges to vulnerable incumbents.”) [hereinafter Ackerman & Ayres,
Why a New Paradigm?].
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fostering a more active and engaged citizenry. Once citizens are given a
stake on equal terms within the Patriot voucher program, “Americans will
be giving renewed social meaning to their self-understanding as free and
equal citizens, engaging in democratic deliberation.”199
In contrast to proposals that would limit the total money available to
candidates, Ackerman and Ayres predict that the net result of their proposal
would be to double the total money available in the system. 200 With such a
large infusion of public money into the campaign system, the authors argue
that their proposal will have “transformative” effects on campaign finance:
Empirical study of the existing marketplace doesn’t provide a clue about
the way politicians will respond to such a massive shift in the financial
playing field. Perhaps some will continue relying almost exclusively on
private funds. But they will have to contend with a host of rising
politicians who will learn to appeal to the interests of Patriot holders. 201

Ackerman and Ayres also provide two additional mechanisms to
guarantee that substantial amounts of Patriot money flow through the
199. ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 15. Of course,
under Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal citizens would still be on unequal terms with regard
to private contributions made outside of the Patriot voucher program. While Ackerman and
Ayres would require private contributions to be made anonymously to address corruption
concerns, see supra note 196, they also call for raising individual contribution limits to “a
stratospheric height that will be practically insignificant to all but the very richest
Americans.” ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 48. The
authors are clearly relying on what they see as the “transformative” effects of the Patriot
voucher program to address the problem of political equality, see infra note 200 and
accompanying text, but combining the Patriot program with significantly higher
contribution limits will severely undermine Patriot’s beneficial effects. A political
contribution incentive program can only establish meaningful equality among individual
donors if it is combined with low contribution limits that prevent private wealth from being
translated into disproportionate political influence.
See infra notes 226-228 and
accompanying text.
200. See Ackerman & Ayres, Why a New Paradigm?, supra note 198, at 1152 (“About $3
billion in private dollars were contributed to all federal candidates during the 2000 election
cycle. We predict that private giving will decline under the [anonymous] donation booth
regime to the $1 to $2 billion range, while Patriot giving will yield approximately $5
billion.”). The authors’ estimate of the amount of Patriot dollars that will actually be
expended, however, is based on the controversial assumption that participation rates in the
program will initially approximate voter turnout in general elections. See ACKERMAN &
AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 4-5 (stating that if “100 million
Americans who came to the polls in 2000 had also ‘voted’ with their patriot cards during the
campaign, their combined contributions would have amounted to $5 billion . . . .”); id. at 31,
51 (assuming that Patriot participation will equal $5 billion). Many reviewers of Voting
With Dollars have argued that this estimate is exceedingly optimistic. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel
E. Charles, Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, and Campaign Finance Reform, 2
ELECTION L.J. 271, 274-76 (arguing that basing estimates of participation on presidential
primary turnout is a more reasonable approach, one which provides a figure of $1.8 billion).
201. Ackerman & Ayres, Why a New Paradigm?, supra note 198, at 1152.
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system in any given election. First, Patriot dollars would be adjusted for
inflation so that their real value does not diminish over time. 202 Second,
the authors would give the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) power to
intervene in the operation of the Patriot system in the event that the overall
funds available to candidates dipped too low or the ratio of private-toPatriot dollars became too high. 203 Ultimately, though, the authors feel that
this emergency mechanism will not be necessary,, as the Patriot system will
create “a wave of enthusiastic citizen engagement” that over time will grow
to exceed voter turnout rates. 204
Critics of voucher systems argue that candidates must expend more
effort to raise money from small donors, and therefore engage in excessive
amounts of fundraising. 205 This criticism is misguided, however, because
it ignores important values that are served by bringing the small-dollar
contributions of average Americans into the political process. With
fundraising linked directly to popular support through a voucher system
such as Patriotor even somewhat imperfectly, through a well-designed
tax credit programcampaigning and fundraising no longer have to be
separate activities. Instituting a well-funded voucher system as the
principal means of funding campaigns 206 would force candidates to appeal
to large portions of the electorate in order to mount viable campaigns.
Exclusive black-tie dinners would become less effective than community

202. ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 218.
203. Id. at 89 (arguing that the FEC should be empowered to exercise “swamping
control” over the Patriot scheme so that public funds always constitute at least two-thirds of
all campaign money). Ackerman and Ayres’s calculation of how many Patriot dollars will
be necessary to maintain their desired two-thirds ratio depends on both their expectations for
relatively high rates of participation in the program and their assumption that the program’s
anonymity element of their proposal will reduce private donations between one half and two
thirds. See supra note 200.
204. ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 90-91. Reviewing
Voting With Dollars in the Election Law Journal, Professor Guy-Uriel Charles argues that
regardless of how powerful incentives to contribute are made, “the incidence of voting will
always surpass contributions as a form of political participation” because “voting is the
highest form of political participationas both a descriptive and normative matter.”
Charles, supra note 200, at 276. As evidence for his argument, Charles cited data showing
the participation rate in Minnesota’s contribution refund program to be 8% for the 2000
elections. See id. (stating that “Minnesota’s campaign financing scheme . . . is the most
analogous comparison to Patriot extant”). But see ACKERMAN & AYRES, VOTING WITH
DOLLARS, supra note 195, at 262-63 n.3 (arguing that the Minnesota system is far less userfriendly than Patriot).
205. See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting
With Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (2003) (“[T]he voucher plan both diverts a
significant portion of public money into fundraising and will require that candidates devote
a significant portion of their campaign time and effort to fundraising.”).
206. See supra note 200.
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barbeques. Personal phone calls to local elites would become less effective
than door-to-door canvassing. To attract large numbers of vouchers,
candidates would have to take distinctive positions that are popular with
grassroots constituencies from across the political spectrum to set them
apart from their rivals. Ackerman and Ayres summarize it best: “In short,
the best fundraising strategy will be effective political communication.”207
A campaign finance voucher system such as the one proposed by
Professors Ackerman and Ayres would provide the most potent form of
political contribution incentive program. All Americans, regardless of their
tax status or their income level, would receive an equal opportunity to
participate in the voucher program alongside their fellow citizens. As
Ackerman and Ayres suggest, such a program would have the potential to
change the face of American politics by empowering average Americans to
become small donors. Past experience with political contribution incentive
programs suggests, however, that such programs are only effective when
the potential recipients of political contributions have an incentive to use
the program to solicit contributions and when the public has been educated
about the existence of the program.
B. Opening Iincentive Pprograms to Ccandidates, Pparties, and
PACs Wwill Eencourage Mmaximum Pparticipation from Ssmall
Ddonors
One way to increase participation in a political contribution incentive
program is to provide the incentive for contributions to a broad range of
political agents, especially those who have a high demand for small-dollar
contributions. As front-line participants in electoral contests, candidates
are the most obvious beneficiaries of the program, but parties have a strong
claim as well. Contributions to political parties are qualitatively different
from contributions to candidates. 208 Parties are generally in a much better
position than individual donors to know where contributions will be used to
the greatest competitive effect, giving parties an important role in
promoting competitive elections.209 Moreover, parties have a greater longterm interest than candidates in developing a base of small donors who

207. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The New Paradigm Revisited, 91 CAL. L. REV. 743,
753 (2003).
208. See Daniel Hayes Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil
is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 310, 348 (1989) (asserting that elections have
become increasingly candidate focused).
209. See id. at 350-54 (arguing that parties should be the primary mechanism for
allocating public campaign funds). Lowenstein also argues, inter alia, for low individual
contribution limits for candidates, parties, and PACs. Id. at 357-59.
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regularly participate in the funding of campaigns. 210 As repeat players in
the political market, parties benefit much more from the associative value
of receiving small contributions from donors who come to feel that they are
among the “party faithful.” 211
It is not likely a coincidence that Oregon’s tax credit for political
contributions has the highest participation rate of any political contribution
incentive program in the country and that it includes both state and federal
entities, including PACs, in its coverage. 212 Some campaign finance
reform advocates wrongly point to PACs as a principal problem with the
current federal campaign finance system because PACs engage in
“bundling.” 213 A “bundler,” who may represent a PAC or be an individual
fundraiser, solicits contributions on behalf of a candidate or party and
arranges for them to be delivered in a way that identifies the entire
“bundle” of contributions with the bundler who solicited them. 214
According to the critics of bundling, PACs are able to use this practice to
win disproportionate influence for the “special interests” that they
represent. 215 This same school of thought led some reformers to oppose

210. Cf. Tashjian v. Repub. Pty. of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-25 (1986) (recognizing
political party’s strong First Amendment interest in defining its own membership and
holding that state cannot bar party from opening its primary to independent voters).
211. See id. at 214 (“[A] [p]arty’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in
and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of [its] right of
association.”).
212. See supra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Jim Motavalli, Chasing the Money: Everyone Talks About Campaign
Finance Reform, But Grassroots Groups Are Making It Happen, E, (Sept.-Oct. 1996 )
(quoting Ellen Miller, executive director of the Center for Responsive Politics, arguing that
low contribution limits are ineffective reforms because “they don’t deal with the bundling
issue”), available at http://www.emagazine.com/september-october_1996/0996feat12.html.
214. Traditionally, a bundler had to gather, physically, the checks of a group of individual
donors and deliver them together in order to get “credit” from the recipient for his or her
bundling. In 1999, however, campaign operatives for then-Governor George W. Bush
developed a system of virtual bundling whereby individual fundraisers were assigned
tracking numbers that contributors could write on their checks to identify the fundraiser who
had successfully solicited their contribution. CHARLES LEWIS & THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC
INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT 2004, at 8 (2004). Using these tracking numbers,
the Bush campaign gave the honorary title of “Pioneer” to fundraisers who raised over
$100,000 for the campaign; in 2004, the campaign added the title of “Ranger” for
fundraisers who raised over $200,000. See id. at 8-9 (“What is unusual about the Pioneer
system is the unabashed directness of the transaction: You help us and we’ll credit you and
remember your loyalty and support later . . . . [S]uch exceptionally well organized bundling
violates the spirit of limiting the size of contributions . . . .”).
215. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth, BOSTON REV., Dec.
1997/Jan. 1998 (stating that “two of the biggest influence abuses” in campaign finance are
“PAC
bundling
and
soft
money”),
available
at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.6/ayres.html.
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the McHugh aAmendment, which would have strengthened the federal tax
credit for political contributions in the 1986 TRA instead of repealing it;
critics of bundling argued that expanding the federal tax credit for political
contributions would only subsidize this practice.216 These opponents of
including PACs in a political contribution incentive program would likely
point to the experience in Oregon to make their case. PACs have become
the primary beneficiaries of Oregon’s tax credit, such that most credit
claims received by the state are made on contributions to “special
interests.” 217
There are several problems with this analysis. First, the predominant
role of PACs in taking advantage of the tax credit must be understood in
tandem with another crucial aspect of Oregon’s campaign finance laws: the
lack of any limits on individual contributions to candidates. In the absence
of regulatory incentives that compel candidates to solicit small-dollar
contributions by promoting the use of the tax credit, credit-subsidized
contributions to candidates are likely to take place at a low rate. 218 PACs,
on the other hand, tend to be issue-oriented or otherwise more narrowly
focused in their fundraising appeals than candidates; as such, many depend
on small-dollar contributions for their existence and are likely to have
much stronger incentives to organize a fundraising campaign around
political contribution incentives.219 Thus, the disproportionate benefits
derived by PACs from Oregon’s tax credit are likely explained in large part
by the incentive structures created by the state’s campaign finance laws,
rather than anything inherent in the credit’s coverage of contributions to
PACs.
More importantly, tailoring campaign finance regulations toward
minimizing the influence of PACs “solves” the wrong problem. “Special
interest” PACs are perceived to be a problem to the extent that they are
able to gain disproportionate influence over legislative outcomes in ways

216. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., supra discussion in note 154.
219. Really, it depends on the PAC. Some PACs are financed almost entirely by small
donations, while others receive substantial amounts of money from large contributions by
wealthy donors. See, e.g., Press Release, Oregon Follow the Money, Money in Politics
Research Action Project, Heavy Hitters on Opposite Sides of the Tax Credits Debate Collect
Cash from Mirror-Image Donors (Aug. 8, 2003) (comparing the contribution profiles of two
major
Oregon
PACs),
available
at
http://www.oregonfollowthemoney.org/Press/aug0803.pdf.
The Oregon Education
Association’s People for Improvement of Education PAC raised 99.4% of its contributions
in amounts of $200 or less from an estimated 18,855 contributors. Id. The Associated
Oregon Industries’ Center for Citizen Leadership PAC raised 97.9% of its contributions in
amounts of $1000 or more from an estimated 33 contributors. Id.
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that distort the political process. PACs that have an intense interest in
legislative outcomes on particular issues can use their resources to conduct
carefully targeted advocacy to lobby candidates on the merits of legislative
proposals, with the promise to support those candidates whose positions
align with their own. 220 The perception that PAC influence is in itself
undesirable rests on the flawed assumption that there is something
inherently wrong with legislative deal-making between representatives and
their constituents. In singling out the deal-making aspect as the problem,
this assumption focuses on concerns over quid pro quo corruption while
ignoring the real problem, which is the political inequality that results when
political actors of any kind are able to turn large sums of private wealth
into legislative influence. 221
A deal made between a legislator and a PACi.e., that the PAC gives
the legislator contributions that encourage him or her to look out for its
interests on particular issuesshould only raise concerns to the extent that
those Americans with significant private wealth are able to use their wealth
as a means of exercising disproportionate influence over the political
process. The real concern should thus be political equality, not corruption
or its appearance. The problem with PAC contributions is the same as the
problem with other forms of hard money. Individual contribution limits to
PACs are currently set at $5000,222 which is a level of political spending
far beyond the means of all but the wealthiest Americans. High
contribution limits functionally guarantee that only a narrow segment of the
population is able to play a meaningful role in the funding of campaigns. 223
Legislative deal-making would not be cause for concern if all citizens

220. See Lowenstein, supra note 209, at 309 (arguing that it is rational for issue-oriented
PACs seeking particular legislative outcomes to give contributions to more candidates than
those who agree completely with their position, “[s]ince the legislative strategist is
interested in the change that the group’s contribution may induce in the candidate’s policy
views, rather than in the absolute location of those views”).
221. For a discussion of this argument in the context of proposals for a voucher system of
public financing, see David A. Strauss, What’s the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on
Campaign Finance Reform, 91 CAL. L. REV. 723, 732 (2003) (“If quid pro quo deals are a
problem only because people with more resources will get unfair advantages, then the real
issue is inequality, not the deals themselves.”).
222. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (2000).
223. THE ROLE OF MONEY, supra note 2, at 17.
According to a nationwide survey funded by the Joyce Foundation during the
1996 congressional elections, 81% of those who gave contributions of at least
$200 reported annual family incomes greater than $100,000. This stood in stark
contrast to the general population at the time, where only 4.6% declared an
income of more than $100,000 on their tax returns.
Id. (citing JOHN GREEN ET AL., INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS:
WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM-MINDED (1998))).
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had an equal opportunity to influence the legislative process. A
comparison to voting is instructive here. Candidates make deals with
particular groups of constituents all the time in return for their votes. This
sort of deal-making is not seen as illegitimate, however, because all citizens
have a right to vote on equal terms. When a PAC is able to wield
disproportionate influence on the legislative process, the deal itself is not
the issue; on the contrary, the real issue is that the PAC is able to bring its
disproportionate access to private wealth to bear in the first place.
When groups of citizens join together to advocate on an issue about
which they care deeply, they are engaging in an activity that is fundamental
to the democratic process. PACs such as the Sierra Club and the NRA
represent groups of citizens who care about particular issues intensely
enough that they are willing to donate money to see that their views on
those issues are given a full hearing in the public discourse. Indeed, this
kind of political association is precisely the kind of intermediate
organization that theorists of American democracy have long argued is
necessary for individual citizens to overcome collective action problems
and organize according to communities of interest.224
Political contribution incentives do not negate the ability of PACs under
a system of high contribution limits to turn private wealth into legislative
influence. So long as incentive programs are narrowly tailored so that their
funds are only available to those who make small contributions, however,
their effect will likely be to raise the percentage of campaign funds that
come from small donors. This will make PACs that rely primarily on small
contributions more viable and also bolster the influence of small donors
within PACs of all kinds.
C.

Incentive Pprograms Sshould Bbe Ccombined Wwith Aadditional
Rreforms that Mmake Ssmall Ccontributions a Ccentral Ppart of
Ffunding Ccampaigns

The effectiveness of a political contribution incentive program can only
be understood when considered as part of the larger system of campaign
finance law within which it operates. In Minnesota, candidates have an
incentive to seek out small donors because the contribution refund program
operates as part of a system that includes moderately lower contribution

224. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 193-94 (George
Lawrence trans., Perennial ed. 2000) (1848) (stating that in America, citizens organize into
political associations “to show their numbers and to lessen the moral authority of the
majority, and . . . by stimulating competition, to discover the arguments most likely to make
an impression on the majority, for they always hope to draw the majority over to their
side.”).
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limits than the federal system and also provides candidates of established
parties with direct grants of public funding linked to voluntary spending
limits. 225 A focus on raising money from small donors is likely to have
significant secondary benefits for a candidate’s campaign. Unlike appeals
to wealthy donors, who represent only a tiny percentage of the electorate,
candidates who are able to rely on small-dollar contributions are free to
appeal to the people for votes and contributions simultaneously. Freed
from the demands of large-dollar fundraising, a candidate’s entire style of
campaigning is likely to be different. Instead of attending exclusive
fundraisers and making telephone calls to wealthy donors, a candidate will
have time for more direct communication with average Americans through
such activities as neighborhood barbeques and door-to-door canvassing.
Establishing policies that will engender a widespread switch to this style of
campaigning, however, will require far-reaching reforms that go well
beyond the enactment of political contribution incentives.
Relying on candidates and other political agents to promote a political
contribution incentive program would be the most efficient approach,
because these actors have the most to gain from promoting the tax credit or
voucher program’s usage. As experience with state programs shows,
however, candidates and political agents will only promote the program to
the extent that the campaign finance laws are structured so that they have
an incentive to seek out small contributions. Because the old federal tax
credit operated under the rubric of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”), 226 little such incentive existed for contribution recipients.
During the years the tax credit was in effect, FECA set individual
contribution limits to candidates at $1000 (or $2000 for joint returns).227
Meanwhile, even at their most generous, the tax credits only reimbursed
individuals for 50% of their first $100 of contributions. In the absence of
low contribution limits or a system of public funding that counterbalances
the impact of large contributions, FECA resulted in a political fundraising

225. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
226. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55). The original FECA legislation was passed in the same
Congress as the creation of the tax credit for political contributions. Supporters of the
Pastore aAmendment saw well-funded methods of public financing, both direct and indirect,
as a necessary complement to the limits that FECA placed on contributions and, before they
were struck down as unconstitutional, expenditures. E.g., 117 CONG. REC. 41,762 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Pastore).
227. E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982). The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act raised
contribution limits to $2000 (or $4000 for joint returns) for the 2004 election cycle and
indexed them to rise with inflation for future cycles. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102-03 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a). For
the current election cycle, individual contribution limits to candidates are at $2100. See id.
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“arms race,” with candidates compelled to raise as many large-dollar
individual contributions as possible in order to compete with their
opponents. 228 Those donors who were already giving anyway were in the
best position to take advantage of the credit, and the credit contained no
mechanism to encourage candidates to target small donors with their
solicitations.
Enacting additional reforms along with a new political contribution
incentive program could help stem the “arms race” effect of current law
and give candidates and other political actors greater incentive to focus
their attentions on average Americans. Lowering contribution limits to
levels that average Americans can afford would give those citizens an
opportunity to participate in the financing of campaigns on an equal footing
with the small percentage of Americans who are able to give large
donations. 229 Providing public financing in forms other than political
contribution incentives (and other than the current system of partial public
funding available to presidential candidates230) would create additional
opportunities for grassroots-driven campaigns.
George Washington
University Law School Professor Spencer Overton has proposed that a tax
credit for political contributions be linked to matching funds that enhance
the value of small contributions at a four-to-one4-to-1 rate. 231 Another
228. See Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Rules and Administration, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Derek Cressman, U.S. PIRG)
(arguing that low contribution limits allow candidates to spend less time coddling individual
donors and more time competing in the marketplace of ideas) [hereinafter Cressman
Testimony], available at http://pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5999&id3=CFR&.
The “arms race” effect of high contribution limits was compounded by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act’s doubling of individual contribution limits to candidates. THE ROLE
OF MONEY, supra note 2, at 36. In the 2002 congressional elections, 94% of candidates who
raised the most money won their elections. Id. at 14. 55.5% of individual contributions to
candidates came in at or above $1000. Id. at 16. While it is impossible to know exactly
how many donors who previously gave the maximum increased their giving to $2000 during
the 2004 election cycle, the higher individual contribution limits are likely to increase the
proportion of campaign funds that come from large-dollar contributions. See Clyde
Wilcoxet al., Raising the Limits, PUB. PERSPECTIVE, May-June 2002, at 11 (finding that
“increased giving is likely to intensify the upper status character of the donor pool”).
229. See, e.g., Cressman Testimony, supra note 228 (citing evidence that in states which
adopted low contribution limits in the 1990’s, the total amount of funds raised by candidates
declined only slightly, while small donor participation increased to make up for most of the
money lost through elimination of large contributions).
230. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-42 (2000) (providing a voluntary system of matching funds
for primary election campaigns and a block grant for general election campaigns, each of
which are linked to spending limits).
231. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and
Participation, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 73, 107 (2004). Like the state PIRGs, Professor
Overton proposes that the tax credit be available for contributions of $100 or less, so that
under his program “if a contributor gives $100 to a candidate, the candidate would receive
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approach to reform would link political contribution incentives and other
forms of public funding to voluntary spending limits that would directly
limit a candidate’s ability to engage in the campaign finance “arms race” if
he or she wanted to receive public funds.232
As a practical matter, efforts to enact wholesale reforms such as these
will likely require extended legislative battles spanning multiple
congressional sessions. The next Partsection discusses how enacting a
federal tax credit for political contributions could be a useful incremental
step toward greater reforms.
III. A WELL-DESIGNED FEDERAL TAX CREDIT FOR POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD BE A FIRST STEP TOWARD ACHIEVING MORE
COMPREHENSIVE REFORMS
Yale Law Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres argue that a wellfunded campaign voucher program is qualitatively superior to imperfect
versions of political contribution incentives because it would reconstitute
campaign finance under a whole new paradigm and in so doing transform
American politics. 233 The professors are betting that making a radical
change in the system will empower individuals to participate in new and
meaningful ways. The original supporters of a federal tax credit for
political contributions had similarly high hopes that their programs would

another $400 in public funds, producing a total contribution worth $500.” Id. at 107.
232. Voluntary spending limits are a central element of Minnesota’s campaign finance
system. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text. If campaign expenditure limits
are not voluntary, they may run afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo,
which struck down expenditure limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act because the
Court held that they were not narrowly tailored to further the government’s compelling
interest in eliminating corruption. 424 U.S. 1, 45-59 (1976). In August 2004, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that campaign expenditure limits enacted in Vermont would
be constitutional under Buckley’s strict scrutiny if they are found to be the least restrictive
means of furthering the state’s compelling interests in “safeguarding Vermont’s democratic
process from 1) the corruptive influence of excessive and unbridled fundraising and 2) the
effect that perpetual fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials.”
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 2004). Voluntary expenditure limits, which
further the same interests, would not face the same strict scrutiny because the government
has greater power to attach voluntary conditions to the receipt of government funds than it
does to regulate primary conduct. See VannNatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 789 (Or. 1997)
(“The legislative choice to encourage certain behavior by tax policy violates no right of any
potential recipient of contributions, because the recipient had no constitutional right to the
contributions-with-tax-credits in the first place.”); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65
(upholding presidential public financing scheme’s voluntary spending limits); Rosenstiel v.
Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1550-51 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding Minnesota’s linkage of
public funding to acceptance of spending limits).
233. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
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foster widespread citizen participation in campaign fundraising. 234
As with tax credits, the biggest problem with vouchers is uncertainty
over the practical effects they will have on campaigns once they are
enacted. 235 Because vouchers are a much more dramatic and expensive
undertaking than tax credits, it will be difficult to convince legislators to
enact such a proposal without some preliminary evidence that it will
actually work. Tax credits are an intermediate step between no public
subsidies for campaigns and a fully-funded voucher system. If a tax credit
is put into place and enjoys at least modest success, a powerful argument
could then be made that the program should be taken out of the tax code
and expanded into a voucher system, which would provide political
contribution incentives that are more potent and available to more people.
A.

Properly Sstructuring a Ttax Ccredit will Iincrease its
Eeffectiveness

For a tax credit program to further the long-term goals of the campaign
finance reform movement, it must be structured so that it is effective even
in the absence of wholesale reform. The credit must be potent enough to
provide a significant incentive to its beneficiaries to promote it to potential
donors. As with other political contribution incentive programs, the credit
should be available to a broad range of political agents, including
candidates, parties, and PACs. The credit should be narrowly tailored so
that it is only available for small contributions. Finally, the enactment of
the credit should be accompanied by independent public education efforts
to encourage the credit’s use as part of a larger civic strategy of
encouraging small donor participation in politics.
1. Offering a 100% tax credit that is both significant in size and
available only for small contributions will provide a potent incentive
targeted toward small donors
For any political contribution incentive program to further its underlying
purposes, it must provide an incentive of a large enough size that it can
have a significant aggregate impact on election campaigns. One criticism
of the old federal tax credit was that its amount was so small that its
benefits were not even worth the administrative and monitoring costs to the

234. See, e.g., supra note 50 and accompanying text.
235. See Briffault, supra note 205, at 673 (arguing that with candidates’ funding entirely
dependent on voters casting their vouchers, “challengers and political newcomers” will face
“uncertainty . . . [that] may discourage some candidates from entering races and thus
diminish electoral competitiveness”).
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IRS to enforce it.236 If the federal government is to create a new tax credit
for political contributions and expect it to have an impact on political
fundraising, then the credit cannot be for a token amount.237 As the object
of the credit is to encourage grassroots campaigns that appeal to small
donors, however, the credit should have an upper limit that is within the
reach of average Americans. 238 A credit that applies to an individual’s first
$100 of contributions, or $200 for joint returns, would best strike this
balance.
A 100% credit will maximize the incentive value to prospective
donors. 239 Even some critics of the old federal tax credit claimed that a
more potent tax incentive would have given candidates sufficient incentive
to mobilize small donors.240 A full credit is the most effective tool for
candidates to use in their solicitation efforts, where they are able to promise
prospective small donors that they will get all of their money back.
The best way for Congress to enact a new federal tax credit for political
contributions would be to combine it with low contribution limits for the
same amount. 241 Under this system, every American would have an
incentive to give at a level that most Americans could afford, and no
American would be able to give more and thus wield disproportionate
influence simply because he or she had a greater ability to give.
As a practical matter, however, Congress may only enact a tax credit
without also lowering the limits on all individual contributions. Even if the
tax credit for political contributions is forced to stand on its own, Congress
can still target the tax credit more closely toward small donors by making it
claimable only for small contributions. For a donor to be eligible for the
tax credit, his or her total contributions in the given election cycle to the
candidate, party, or PAC to which he or she claims to have made crediteligible contributions should not exceed the maximum amount of the
credit. 242 This provision is the most effective way to target the tax credit at
236. See supra text accompanying note 86.
237. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 16 (calling for a credit of $200 per person, or $400
for joint returns).
238. Indeed, one reason Congress initially created such a small tax credit was so that it
would provide a significant incentive only for contributors who would otherwise be unable
to afford to give. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
239. See Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 16 (calling for a 100% credit).
240. E.g., Tax Credits Hearings, supra note 64, at 79 (statement of George E. Agree,
Chairman, Comm. for the Democratic. Process).
241. See Cressman Testimony, supra note 228 (arguing that low contribution limits allow
candidates to spend less time soliciting contributions from individual donors and more time
running issue-driven campaigns, leading to substantial increases in small donor
participation).
242. This provision would necessarily be enforced largely through voluntary reporting, as
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small donors, because it focuses directly on whether the credit is being
claimed for small contributions rather than trying to discriminate among
the donors themselves. Moreover, this limitation will no doubt make the
tax credit proposal much less costly, preventing those who are already
giving large-dollar donations from subsidizing them with the credit.
Evaluating the effect that limiting the tax credit to small donors would have
on both participation and cost is an important area in which further study is
needed.
2.

Like other incentive programs, the tax credit should be provided for
contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs

In order for a tax credit for political contributions to encourage as many
small donors to contribute to campaigns as possible, the credit should be
available for contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs. As experience
with Oregon’s tax credit demonstrates, smaller issue-oriented PACs may
have a much greater incentive to organize small donors to take advantage
of the credit. 243 Although these PACs are frequently derided as “special
interests,” their political activity is just as fundamental to American
democracy as that of any other political actor.244 The tax credit for
political contributions could thus play an important role in encouraging
PACs to bring small donors into the political process who might not
otherwise participate.
3.

Public education efforts are necessary to inform the public of the
credit’s existence

Simply passing a tax credit or other contribution incentive program will
not magically bring large numbers of non-participants into the political
fundraising process. As a threshold matter, members of the public must
know that the program exists and how to take advantage of it. Even in
states with well-established tax credit programs, there has never been a
widespread, non-partisan effort to educate the public about the programs.
In Minnesota, where the contribution refund program is considered a
success, a recent study suggested that public education efforts would raise
the program’s participation rate even further.245 A more detailed survey
performed by the Campaign Finance Institute in 2002 found that only 27%
of Ohioans were aware of their state’s tax credit for political

are most aspects of our tax code.
243. See supra notes 173, 219 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text.
245. Ramsden & Donnay, supra note 137, at 39.

CMARCHRISTENSEN

2005]

2/3/2011 10:02 PM

SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY

149

contributions, 246 though it had at the time been in existence for eight
years. 247 More than 20% of those surveyed said that they would have been
more likely to give if they had known about the tax credit. 248 The
Campaign Finance Institute is also in the process of conducting a field
experiment to test whether a public information campaign could lead to
additional contributions to campaigns. The Institute mailed non-partisan
brochures explaining the tax credit for political contributions to a random
sample of Ohioans and will publish findings on the extent to which this
mailing resulted in additional citizen participation in the tax credit
program. 249 Additional research is needed in other states and with other
forms of public education.
A new federal tax credit for political contributions should be
accompanied by public education efforts in order to build awareness and
counteract incentives within the current federal system of campaign finance
law that focus candidates’ solicitation efforts away from small political
contributions. Even though the proposed new credit is more potent in
various ways than the old credit, it would still have to operate in a system
of high contribution limits similar to the system that existed at the time of
the original federal tax credit.250 As occurred with the original federal tax
credit, candidates would have a limited incentive to use the credit to solicit
contributions from small donors when the law allows them to solicit large
contributions from wealthy donors instead. 251 Indeed, a candidate’s
incentive to solicit from small donors is even further reduced following the
passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which increased the
amount that an individual is allowed to contribute to a candidate from
$1000 to $2000 per election. 252 If the object of a new federal tax credit for
political contributions is to increase the involvement of small donors in
American politics, Congress cannot simply rely on candidates, parties, and
PACs to promote the credit and inform the public of its existence if other
aspects of campaign finance law give them little incentive to do so. In the
absence of congressional consensus to adopt wholesale reforms of the

246. ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTION TAX CREDITS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 12 (2003).
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id. at 28. 4.7% said that they would have been “very likely” to give, while 17.5%
said that they would have been “somewhat likely” to give. Id.
249. Id. at 23.
250. See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
251. See id.
252. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81,
102-03 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a). The Act also indexed contribution limits to inflation.
See id.
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campaign finance laws, any legislation that proposes a new tax credit for
public contributions should include a special earmark to the IRS to
publicize the credit.
B. A Nnew Ffederal Ttax Ccredit for Ppolitical Ccontributions Wwill
Bbe a Ddirect Iinvestment in a Hhealthier Ddemocracy with Oonly
Mmodest Ccosts
The fundamental objection of members of Congress who voted in 1986
to repeal the tax credit for political contributions was that its benefits did
not outweigh its costs. 253 In its peak year of 1980, when 7.2% of eligible
filers took advantage of the tax credit for political contributions, the
program’s total cost was only $269.8 million. 254 The American Enterprise
Institute has estimated that a new federal tax credit for political
contributions to candidates and parties would cost less than $1 billion per
year. 255 Further study is needed of the costs of a new federal tax credit for
political contributions. Nevertheless, even if the tax credit were to cost a
full $1 billion, it would still be less than one twentieth of one percent of the
federal government’s expenditures in 2003.256 Compared to the $39 billion
that the federal government spent on tax credits in 2002,257 these
253. S. REP. NO. 99-313 (1986).
254. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. At that time, the political contributions
credit was only a 50% tax credit for the first $50 of an individual’s contributions ($100 for
joint returns). See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
255. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 19, 66-67. The American Enterprise Institute
estimated the costs of four alternative designs for a tax credit. Id. at 66-67. The Institute
estimates that a 100% tax credit of $200 for individual and $400 for joint returns, with an
income cap of $100,000 (i.e., no taxpayer could claim the credit whose income exceeded
$100,000), would cost $998.4 million in the fourth year after it was enacted. Id. at 66. The
Institute estimates that the same credit with an income cap of $50,000 would cost $529.9
million in the fourth year. Id. at 67. If the amount of the credit is reduced to $100 for
individual and $200 for joint returns, the Institute estimates that the credit would cost $499.2
million in its fourth year with an income cap of $100,000 and $265 million in its fourth year
with an income cap of $50,000. Id. The state PIRGs recommend a 100% tax credit of $100
for individual and $200 for joint returns, with eligibility for the credit limited to
contributions that do not exceed those amounts. See supra notes 236-252 and
accompanying text. The state PIRGs recommend limiting the tax credit to small-dollar
contributions rather than establishing an income cap in order to target the incentive directly
toward encouraging small political contributions of all kinds rather than arbitrarily targeting
the incentive toward contributors who have a particular income in a given year. See supra
note 242 and accompanying text. Unlike the American Enterprise Institute, the state PIRGs
recommend extending the eligibility of the tax credit to PACs. See supra notes 243-244 and
accompanying text.
256. See Cong.
Budget Office., CBO’s Current Budget Projections, at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1821&sequence=0 (last visited Mar. 7, 2005)
(reporting that the federal government spent $2.159 trillion in fiscal year 2003).
257. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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preliminary estimates suggest that the credit would involve relatively
modest new expenditures of federal funds.
Moreover, structuring a new federal tax credit in ways that have proven
successful in the states will strengthen the credit program and make it a
more cost-effective investment in our democracy. Narrowly tailoring the
tax credit so that it provides a direct incentive to small donors to participate
should result in a measurable increase in small contributions to political
campaigns. A new federal tax credit for political contributions will also
facilitate candidates’ use of the Internet to mobilize the donations and
support of grassroots constituencies from across the political spectrum. If
and when political contribution incentive programs are proven to work, the
debate can then shift to their potential value to society. By enabling more
small donors to participate in funding campaigns, a new federal tax credit
for political contributions will increase the voice of average Americans in
deciding which candidates are able to run viable campaigns for elected
office.
Increasing the role of small donors in funding campaigns will force
candidates, parties, and PACs to articulate political agendas that have a
greater appeal to average Americans. In its 2002 Ohio survey, the
Campaign Finance Institute found that the more than 20% of respondents
who said that a tax credit would make them more likely to make a political
contribution were closer to the general public in age, income, political
affiliation, and other characteristics than were the 3.9% who identified
themselves as current campaign contributors.258 Political contribution
incentive programs make a small donor’s willingness to make a political
contribution less dependent on his or her financial ability to make that
contribution. 259 By bringing small donors into the campaign finance
system who would otherwise be unable to participate in the “wealth
primary,” a tax credit for political contributions would empower small
donors to play a more meaningful, substantive role at the early stage when
crucial decisions are made concerning which candidates choose to run for
office and whether or not those candidates are able to run viable
campaigns.
A well-designed federal tax credit for political contributions could play
an important role in encouraging new donors to participate in the funding

258. BOATRIGHT & MALBIN, supra note 246, at 13-15. The 3.9% figure is likely to be an
exaggerated number. Data from the Ohio Secretary of State suggests that only 0.6% of
Ohioans gave contributions to state candidates in 2002. Id. at 10 n.9.
259. See Smith, supra note 26, at 119-55 (arguing that political contribution incentive
programs weaken the correlation between an individual’s income and the likelihood that he
or she will make a political contribution).
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of campaigns. The Campaign Finance Institute’s 2002 Ohio survey
indicated that those most receptive to becoming new donors in response to
a tax credit were young adults who did not already have strongly formed
political beliefs.260 As political participation is significantly influenced by
habits formed early in life, political contribution incentive programs could
create a “ripple effect” that promotes progressively greater levels of citizen
participation over time. 261 While a new federal tax credit for political
contributions would not likely lead to a sharp increase in the number of
campaign contributors, a well-designed program could have significant
cumulative effects over a period of years. As more and more donors
develop a sense of ownership over their democracy, public interest and
civic engagement are likely to increase.
A new federal tax credit for political contributions also could help
encourage a new and promising trend in American politics: using the
Internet as a tool for generating small contributions and encouraging citizen
participation in grassroots campaigns. 262 This phenomenon became
prominent during the race for the 2004 Democratic presidential
nomination. Presidential candidates’ historical dependence on wealthy
donors largely remained true in the 2004 Democratic primary campaign.263
Two relative political outsiders bucked this trend, however, and enjoyed
surprising success using the Internet to attract small-dollar contributions
and organize grassroots supporters. The Internet activities of these
candidatesformer Vermont Governor Howard Dean and General Wesley
Clarkmade them surprisingly strong contenders in the months before the
260. Id. at 22.
261. Id. at 3.
262. It is important to note, however, that the Internet is not a panaceait is simply a
new tool for facilitating political communication and participation. Because wealthy, white,
well-educated Americans have a disproportionate amount of access to the Internet and make
disproportionate use of it, the Internet is unlikely to overcome existing political inequality
within American society on its own. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY &
AM. DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 8. Moreover, because of the Internet’s decentralization
and sheer size, those who are not already politically attuned are unlikely to be drawn into
political involvement simply because the Internet is available to them. See id. at 8 (“In
short, the Internet may ‘activate the active’ and widen the disparities between participants
and the politically disengaged by making it easier for the already engaged to gain political
information, to make political connections, and [to] contribute money.”).
263. Here, the “2004 Democratic primary campaign” includes both 2003 pre-primary
campaign fundraising and electioneering (i.e., the period in which the wealth primary takes
place, see supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text) and the contested primary season,
which ended on March 2, 2004 when Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) became the de facto
Democratic presidential nominee following victories in nine of ten “Super Tuesday”
primaries. Adam Nagourney, Kerry in Big Victories Across the Nation; Edwards Will Quit
Race, an Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A1. The Democratic campaign
fundraising data reported here represents totals as of February 29, 2004.
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2004 primary season. 264 Though the campaigns of both candidates fizzled
during the primaries themselves, their use of the Internet enabled them to
emerge from the “wealth primary” as candidates with legitimate chances to
win their party’s nomination. 265
During the 2004 Democratic presidential primary campaign, the ten
major candidates raised a total of $160.6 million in individual contributions
through March 1, 2004. 266 Of this money, 49% came through contributions
in amounts of $1000 or more, while only 32% came through contributions
in amounts of less than $200. 267 The disparity between large-dollar and
small-dollar contributors becomes much larger, however, once the effects
of Governor Dean’s substantial small-donor fundraising are factored out of
the totals. Dean led the candidates in fundraising, raising $50.6 million in
individual contributions. 268 Fifty-nine percent of Dean’s money came in
amounts less than $200, while only 19% came in amounts of $1000 or
more. 269 Of the $110 million in individual contributions raised by the other
nine candidates, 63% was collected in amounts of $1,000 or more and only
19% came in amounts less than $200. 270 The fundraising percentages of
these candidates were similar to those of the 2000 Democratic primary
campaign, where Vice President Al Gore and former New Jersey Senator
Bill Bradley raised a total of $60 million in individual contributions, with

264. See Susan Page & Richard Benedetto, Clark closes in on Dean in poll, USA TODAY,
Jan. 7, 2004, at 1A (reporting that in national polls taken two weeks before the Iowa
Caucuses, Dean led all Democratic presidential candidates with 24%, but Clark was gaining
ground and came in second with 20%). The race for the nomination changed dramatically,
however, when Senator Kerry pulled off a dramatic come-from-behind victory in the Iowa
Caucuses. See Adam Nagourney & Edward Wyatt, The 2004 Campaign: The Changing
Race: After Iowa, New Hampshire Just Doesn’t Look the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004,
at A22 (reporting that Kerry’s come-from-behind victory in Iowa derailed Dean’s
nomination strategy and undermined Clark’s plan to skip Iowa and focus on New
Hampshire).
265. See Nagourney & Wyatt, supra note 264.
266. CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING FROM INDIVIDUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS, at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/pdf/Table1_Feb.pdf (last visited May 7, 2005)
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING]. The ten major candidates for the 2004
Democratic presidential nomination were General Clark, Governor Dean, Senator John
Edwards (N.C.), Congressman Richard Gephardt (Mo.), Senator Bob Graham (Fla.),
Senator Kerry, Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Ohio), Senator Joe Lieberman (Conn.),
former Senator Carol Moseley Braun (Ill.), and Reverend Al Sharpton. Id.
267. Id. By comparison, over the same period President George W. Bush raised $155.8
million in individual contributions. Id. Seventy-five percent of Bush’s contributions came
in amounts of $1000 or more, while only 17% of his contributions came in amounts less
than $200. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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65% collected in amounts of $1000 or more and only 15% collected in
amounts less than $200. 271 Thus, while the totals for the 2004 Democratic
presidential primary campaign are significantly different than they were in
2000, these differences were mostly due to the Dean campaign’s success
raising money from small donors over the Internet. Using this approach,
Dean’s ratio of small-dollar to large-dollar contributions was almost the
mirror image of the combined ratio of the other candidates. 272
The Dean campaign also made effective use of the Internet as a tool for
grassroots organizing. 273 The campaign used the Internet to organize its
operations under a decentralized model and coordinate with self-organized
networks of volunteers in places where it had no formal organizational
presence. 274 Unlike most campaigns, which are run from the top down
with tight controls on their message and activities, the Dean campaign
made efforts to mobilize supporters who acted independently on behalf of
the campaign. 275 The campaign proved itself responsive to suggestions
from these grassroots activists, with whom it communicated via Internet
web logs. 276 While no study has yet been done of the number of active
Dean volunteers who also supported the campaign through small-dollar
contributions, the overlap was likely substantial. The Dean campaign
successfully engaged large numbers of citizens at the grassroots level by
making use of the Internet to solicit small donations and encourage active
participation in campaign events. 277 Although the Dean campaign was not
itself successful in turning grassroots enthusiasm into victories at the polls,
politicians of all stripes have sought to incorporate the successful aspects of
Dean’s Internet strategy into their own campaigns. 278

271. Id.
272. Representative Kucinich actually raised a higher percentage of his funds from small
donors than Dean (68%) and a lower percentage of his funds in contributions of $1000 or
more (13%). Id. Kucinich only raised $6 million, however. Id.
273. For a more detailed discussion of the Dean strategy, see generally TRIPPI, supra note
8.
274. See Jim Drinkard & Jill Lawrence, Online, off and running: Web a New Campaign
Front, USA TODAY, July 15, 2003, at 1A (reporting that “Dean . . . is rewriting the playbook
on how to organize, finance and mold a presidential campaign”).
275. See id. (reporting that groups of Dean supporters have independently organized
activities such as letter-writing campaigns and community service projects with the blessing
of the campaign).
276. Id.
277. See Liz Marlantes, Web may revolutionize fundraising, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 31, 2003, at 2 (“One aspect that makes the Internet particularly intriguing as a
campaign tool is that, unlike televisionthe main political medium for a half-centuryit
gives people a heightened sense of connection to campaigns and even a degree of
empowerment.”).
278. See Susan Page, While losing, Dean has transformed race, politics, USA TODAY,
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General Wesley Clark declared his candidacy for the 2004 Democratic
presidential nomination in late September 2003, just two weeks before the
end of the third fundraising quarter. 279 In those two weeks, the Clark
campaign reported that it quickly raised $3.5 million in contributions in
amounts averaging $175 per donor. 280 Two thirds of Clark’s contributions
were raised online. 281 Once Clark established himself as a serious
contender for the Democratic nomination, his fundraising practices evolved
into those of a more traditional candidate.282 Clark raised a total of $17.3
million in individual contributions in the 2004 Democratic presidential
primary campaign, with 49% for amounts of $1000 or more and 31% for
amounts less than $200. 283 Nevertheless, Clark’s early reliance on Internet
fundraising from small donors made his candidacy possible.
Clark’s success with Internet fundraising reflects the manner in which he
began his campaign. For months prior to the official declaration of his
candidacy, Clark supporterswithout any direct contact with the
Generalorganized the “Draft Wesley Clark” movement, a grassroots
political movement aimed at establishing a rudimentary campaign
organization for the General and convincing him to run. 284 Prior to Clark’s
entry into the race, the movement had generated more than $1 million in
pledges for campaign contributions and recruited volunteers and operatives
in all fifty states. 285 Like the Dean campaign, the Draft Wesley Clark
movement showed that the Internet has opened up tremendous new
possibilities for grassroots candidates who are funded by small donors.
With both Dean and Clark using Internet fundraising and organizing
efforts to establish themselves as viable candidates for the 2004
Democratic primaries, it is clear that the Internet has already started to

Feb. 9, 2004, at 1A (“Now [other candidates] have copied the techniques that worked, from
telethon-like fundraising challenges to chatty candidate ‘blogs’ detailing their day. The
Internet fundraising blueprint devised by the Dean campaign is likely to be followed by
presidential candidates contemplating races in 2008 and beyond.”).
279. Adam Nagourney, Clark Makes it 10, Roiling Democratic Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2003, at A1.
280. Press Release, Clark for President, General Clark Raises Nearly $3.5 Million in Two
Weeks (Oct. 15, 2003), available at http://clark04.com/press/release/021/.
281. Id.
282. See Joanna Weiss, Clark Aides Say Recent Donations Net $10.4 Million, Matching
Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 2004, at A7 (reporting that “traditional Democratic
fundraisers who watched Clark stumble in the early days of his campaign . . . opened their
wallets when they saw him improving in appearances and gaining traction in the polls”).
283. PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING, supra note 266.
284. Michael Janofsky, General is Said to Want to Join ‘04 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2003, at A29.
285. Id.
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change the face of political campaigns. The Internet provides an exciting
new way for campaigns to tap large pools of potential small donors, and it
could help make a federal tax credit for political contributions more
significant to a grassroots political campaign than was ever previously
possible. Much as Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura was able to take
advantage of the PCR program in fundraising appeals on his web site,286
the fundraising drives of federal candidates could feature on their campaign
websites a prominent display reading “Contribute Here . . . For Free” or
“Support [Candidate] and Get Your Money Back.” Experience with
political contribution incentive programs in the states suggests that
participation in a political contribution incentive program is chiefly
dependant on the efforts of candidates and other political agents to promote
the program in their fundraising efforts.287 The style of campaigning
employed by Dean and Clarkusing the Internet to appeal directly to small
donors and to organize volunteersis well-suited to encouraging donor
participation with the help of a tax credit for political contributions.288
If there had been a federal tax credit for political contributions on the
books during the 2004 Democratic primary campaign, the Dean
campaign’s phenomenal Internet fundraising success would undoubtedly
have been even greater. The Dean campaign became known for its
constant, creative use of e-mail solicitation to encourage its supporters to
make small contributions whenever they could afford them. 289 This steady
stream of e-mail into Dean supporters’ inboxes made it very easy for them
to contribute whenever they were inclined to do so. 290 Yet if the Dean
campaign also had been able to promote a tax credit for political

286. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., supra note 156 and accompanying text.
288. It is not surprising, then, that Howard Deanwho made campaign finance reform an
important focus of his campaigncalled for a 100% tax credit for the first $100 of every
individual contribution to a federal candidate. DEAN FOR AMERICA, “TAKE BACK OUR
DEMOCRACY”: AN AGENDA FOR REAL CAMPAIGN REFORM (2003). In Dean’s proposal, the
tax credit would only be available to Americans earning $50,000 or less per year ($100,000
for joint returns). Id.
289. See Page, supra note 278, at 1A.
290. See, e.g., Paul Boutin, Howard’s Web: The Internet couldn’t save Dean, but it could
still help Kerry, SLATE, Feb. 18, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2095707 (last visited May
7, 2005).
According to contribution charts at fundrace.org, Dean’s campaign did
particularly well at drawing repeat donations from large numbers of people
dispersed over a wide range of ZIP codes. Sounds like a classic example of the
Internet’s reach and convenience . . . . A friend surprised me yesterday by
admitting he’s given $150 to Dean in several batches, in part because “‘they made
it so easy.”’
Id.
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contributions as part of its fundraising appeal, the knowledge that they
would receive $100 of their contributions back at tax time would have
made it substantially easier for Dean’s supporters to donate. Although
Howard Dean fell short of his goal of raising $200 million by attracting
$100 contributions from 2 million Americans, 291 a $100 tax credit could
have made this goal much more attainable.
Moreover, as the fundraising successes of General Wesley Clark and
Governor Jesse Ventura demonstrate, the benefits of a political contribution
incentive program are not limited to candidates of any one party or
ideological affiliation. Prospective small donors will come in all
ideological shapes and partisan sizes, and contribution incentives will
benefit any candidate who can effectively reach out to small donors and
persuade them to contribute.
C. A Vvoucher Ssystem is a Ffairer and Mmore Eeffective Wway to
Aadminister Ppolitical Ccontribution Iincentives Oover the Llong
Tterm
The tax code is a frequently used vehicle for federal policy making. The
Internal Revenue Service administers a complex system of regulations;
adding one additional tax credit to the system will create only marginal
administrative costs. Nevertheless, creating a political contribution
incentive in the tax code has two major disadvantages. First, using the tax
code weakens the incentive by making it more complicated to claim and
making reimbursement less immediate. Second, a significant percentage of
the population, particularly those with low incomes, will not have the tax
liability necessary to take advantage of a tax credit. Because of these
disadvantages, a federal tax credit for political contributions is only a shortterm solution to the problem of small-donor participation in campaign
finance. Once the tax credit is enacted, campaign finance reform advocates
should press for its expansion into a comprehensive campaign finance
voucher system such as that advocated by Professors Ackerman and Ayres.
Many citizens do not even file tax returns, and of those who do, many do
not have sufficient tax liability to take advantage of a new tax credit.292
The estimated voting-age population for the 2002 election was
215,139,087. 293 In 2002, Americans filed a total of 130,201,415 tax

291. Thomas Edsall, Dean Declines Public Funds for Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2003, at A6.
292. MICHAEL MCDONALD, VOTING AGE POPULATION AND VOTING ELIGIBLE POPULATION
ESTIMATES, at http://elections.gmu.edu/VAP_VEP.htm (last visited May 7, 2005).
293. See id.
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returns representing 181,730,902 adults. 294 Those adults who had no
reason to file taxes at all would be unable to take advantage of a new tax
credit. Of those who did file tax returns, only 102,479,207 owed income
tax prior to claiming any tax credits. 295 After taking advantage of existing
tax credits, only 91,078,178 still had additional tax liability. 296
Thus, while some taxpayers may be able to structure their behavior
differently in response to the addition of a new tax credit, a significant
percentage of tax filers will have no use for it. 297 One way to address this
problem is to make the tax credit refundable, so that individuals are fully
reimbursed whether they have tax liability or not. While this change would
raise the cost of the credit to the public treasury, it would do so in a way
that makes participation accessible to more Americans.
For citizens who can take advantage of a traditional tax credit,
participating in the credit program requires that they in effect float an
interest-free loan to a candidate or other political agent that the government
will ultimately repay. Even for credits that provide 100% reimbursement,
the donors must lay out their own money and bear the opportunity costs
between the time of the contribution and the time their taxes are processed.
These obstacles to full participation in a tax credit program make it
worthwhile to explore means to administer political contribution incentives
outside of the tax code. The Minnesota contribution refund program
provides one model.
Though the contribution refund program is
administered by the same state agency that oversees the state’s income tax
system, applications for refunds are processed year-round and are in no
way linked to whether the donor files a tax return or has tax liability.298
The Minnesota contribution refund program makes political contribution
incentives available to all citizens, not just those with tax liability, and by
offering reimbursement in the short term it creates a stronger incentive to
contribute. Nevertheless, the contribution refund program does not
completely eliminate all opportunity costs that discourage full participation
by new contributors, for it still requires contributors to expend their own
money and to wait several weeks for their refund to be processed.
Administering political contribution incentives through a campaign

294. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 106 (reporting total number of returns and
joint returns for 2002). This data is preliminary data only, revised by the Internal Revenue
Service as of May 2004. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Smith, supra note 26, at 72-73. For a detailed discussion of the Minnesota
contribution refund program, see supra notes 149-169 and accompanying text.
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finance voucher system is the most effective long-term way to encourage
small donor participation. A federal tax credit for political contributions is
an important, and perhaps even a necessary, step toward that long-term
goal. While a new federal tax credit would not provide an incentive to all
Americans, it has significant potential to encourage those it does reach to
give small contributions to political campaigns. As the effects of political
contribution incentive programs are proven over time, they can be
expanded into more comprehensive programs.
CONCLUSION
Political contribution incentive programs are a highly promising
approach to the challenge of increasing the voice of small donors in
political campaigns. The programs empower small donors while also
bringing new dollars into the campaign fundraising process that balance to
some extent the dominant role played by the small percentage of
Americans who can afford to give large donations. Political contribution
incentive programs bolster the viability of candidates who direct their
campaigns primarily toward grassroots constituencies. The success of
Governor Jesse Ventura in Minnesotadue in part to his active solicitation
of contributions through the contribution refund programshows that
political contribution incentive programs can actually work to level the
political playing field if enacted as part of a more comprehensive package
of reforms such as low contribution limits or public financing, or both.
Meanwhile, presidential candidates Howard Dean and Wesley Clark
demonstrated the potential of the Internet as an organizing tool for small
donors on a national scale. A political contribution incentive program at
the federal level would provide an even greater boost to dynamic
campaigns as diverse as those of Jesse Ventura, Howard Dean, and Wesley
Clark that seek to engage average Americans from across the political
spectrum and promote popular participation in politics.
In order to be effective, political contribution incentive programs must
cover contributions to a broad range of political agents and be potent
enough that both contributors and recipients have an incentive to use them.
The background of laws and regulations upon which the program is placed
also can enhance or undermine its effectiveness. Ultimately, participation
in incentive programs is driven more by the activities of the recipients of
contributions than by the circumstances of the donors. To maximize
participation, incentive programs should apply to donations to PACs as
well as candidates and parties. In the current federal system, where
contribution limits are high and other forms of public financing of
campaigns are limited, a tax credit may only have modest effects on the
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demand of candidates and parties for small-dollar contributions. Many
PACs, however, are likely to have a high demand for small-dollar
contributions; making them eligible for the credit could greatly increase
credit participation rates and foster issue-centered political activity that is
important to a healthy, well-functioning democracy.
A tax credit for political contributions is not a panacea, but it may be an
important incremental step toward more comprehensive reforms. The cost
of the tax credit is a small investment in democracy that could yield
substantial dividends in increasing the voice of average Americans and
possibly also lead to greater long-term citizen involvement. A tax credit
would encourage citizens to make small annual investments in politics that
would give them a sense of ownership over their democracy. Proposals for
a tax credit also could be linked with other important reform measures,
such as those that provide public funding to match small donor
contributions. More importantly, even a modestly successful tax credit
could furnish important evidence that political contribution incentives work
to reduce political inequality in the campaign finance system. Since the
FEC now itemizes contributions of $200 or more, it is now possible to
measure with greater precision the effects that political contribution
incentive programs have on small donor participation. If the available
evidence proves persuasive, then the principles underlying political
contribution incentives could be feasibly expanded into a system of
voucher-based public financing. Such a system would give all citizens
opportunities for full and equal participation in political campaigns and
would completely redefine the way campaigns are conducted. A wellfunded voucher system would create a new kind of political market, one in
which significant private wealth does not enjoy disproportionate influence.
In this new market, a candidate’s most effective means of campaigning
would be to communicate his or her ideas to the voting public.

